Reconciliation is the best solution for conflict in Aceh by Basuki, Supriyanto
Calhoun: The NPS Institutional Archive
Theses and Dissertations Thesis Collection
2003-12
Reconciliation is the best solution for conflict in Aceh
Basuki, Supriyanto












Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited 
RECONCILIATION IS THE BEST SOLUTION FOR 








 Thesis Advisor:   Gaye Christoffersen 





















THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 i
 REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE Form Approved OMB No. 0704-0188 
Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including 
the time for reviewing instruction, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and 
completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any 
other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington 
headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 
1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302, and to the Office of Management and Budget, Paperwork Reduction Project 
(0704-0188) Washington DC 20503. 
1. AGENCY USE ONLY (Leave blank) 
 
2. REPORT DATE  
December 2003 
3. REPORT TYPE AND DATES COVERED 
Master’s Thesis 
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE:  Reconciliation is the Best Solution for Conflict in 
Aceh 
6. AUTHOR(S) Supriyanto Basuki 
5. FUNDING NUMBERS 
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey, CA  93943-5000 
8. PERFORMING 
ORGANIZATION REPORT 
NUMBER   
9. SPONSORING /MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 
N/A 
10. SPONSORING/MONITORING 
 AGENCY REPORT NUMBER 
11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES  The views expressed in this thesis are those of the author and do not reflect the official 
policy or position of the Department of Defense or the U.S. Government. 
12a. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENT   
Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited 
12b. DISTRIBUTION CODE 
13. ABSTRACT (maximum 200 words)  
The history of the conflict in Aceh began in the pre-colonial era, during which the Acehnese struggled to fight the 
Dutch for more than three centuries.  The conflict has continued for the last three decades between the Indonesian central 
government and the GAM (Free Aceh Movement).  The GAM has been able to develop and improve its struggle using 
conventional and modified guerilla tactics.  The GAM leadership in exile utilizes central government and military weaknesses 
to their advantage, including the collapse of the strong authoritarian government in 1998 and the independence of East Timor 
afterward.  They succeed in exploiting the populace’s grievances in order to create enemy images of Indonesian colonialism in 
Aceh.  The central government and military responses to confront conflict in Aceh have never changed much, and the military 
has always been the primary option.  Though military operations have been able to suppress the rebels, it also has a negative 
impact on Acehnese society due to weaknesses within the military, such as less professional soldiers and a limited budget.  
Dialogue between the GAM and the central government took place in 1999, but ended in failure in 2003, and the central 
government launched an integrated operation.  As the rebel movement escalates, military action that led to the integrated 
operation was necessary and unavoidable to restore the government system and public law and order.  Nevertheless, with the 
lessons learned from the past rebellion, the merely military option would not be sufficient to win the war in Aceh.  Aceh needs 
more comprehensive policies starting with reconciliation followed by economic and governance rehabilitations.  The required 
prerequisites for reconciliation are ending the hostilities between leaders and giving more incentives for rebels in the field to 
surrender.  The latter needs the trust that can be built by granting amnesty or sentence reduction to ex-rebels.  At the same time, 
internal improvements should also be made within the military to foster better performance.  Reconciliation and societal 
development do not need to halt military action as long as the security of the Acehnese and public order are still threatened. 
15. NUMBER OF 
PAGES  
95 
14. SUBJECT TERMS  Aceh, GAM, Free Aceh Movement 

















NSN 7540-01-280-5500 Standard Form 298 (Rev. 2-89)  





















THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 iii
Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited 
 
 
RECONCILIATION IS THE BEST SOLUTION FOR CONFLICT IN ACEH 
 
Supriyanto Basuki 
Lieutenant Colonel, Indonesian Air Force 
 
 
Submitted in partial fulfillment of the 
requirements for the degree of 
 
 
MASTER OF ARTS IN SECURITY STUDIES 










Author:  Supriyanto Basuki 
 
 








James J. Wirtz 




























The history of the conflict in Aceh began in the pre-colonial era, during which the 
Acehnese struggled to fight the Dutch for more than three centuries.  The conflict has 
continued for the last three decades between the Indonesian central government and the 
GAM (Free Aceh Movement).  The GAM has been able to develop and improve its 
struggle using conventional and modified guerilla tactics.  The GAM leadership in exile 
utilizes central government and military weaknesses to their advantage, including the 
collapse of the strong authoritarian government in 1998 and the independence of East 
Timor afterward.  They succeed in exploiting the populace’s grievances in order to create 
enemy images of Indonesian colonialism in Aceh.  The central government and military 
responses to confront conflict in Aceh have never changed much, and the military has 
always been the primary option.  Though military operations have been able to suppress 
the rebels, it also has a negative impact on Acehnese society due to weaknesses within 
the military, such as less professional soldiers and a limited budget.  Dialogue between 
the GAM and the central government took place in 1999, but ended in failure in 2003, 
and the central government launched an integrated operation.  As the rebel movement 
escalates, military action that led to the integrated operation was necessary and 
unavoidable to restore the government system and public law and order.  Nevertheless, 
with the lessons learned from the past rebellion, the merely military option would not be 
sufficient to win the war in Aceh.  Aceh needs more comprehensive policies starting with 
reconciliation followed by economic and governance rehabilitations.  The required 
prerequisites for reconciliation are ending the hostilities between leaders and giving more 
incentives for rebels in the field to surrender.  The latter needs the trust that can be built 
by granting amnesty or sentence reduction to ex-rebels.  At the same time, internal 
improvements should also be made within the military to foster better performance.  
Reconciliation and societal development do not need to halt military action as long as the 
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I. INTRODUCTION  
A. THESIS BACKGROUND 
Aceh has long played a special and vital role in Indonesia.  The area now enjoys 
special status under Indonesian rule, yet it remains one of the most rebellious provinces 
in the country.1  The first rebellion in Aceh occurred in 1953 and it did not call for 
Acehnese independence, but rather, greater local autonomy and a stronger role for Islam 
in the national government.2  After seven years, the conflict ended peacefully in 1962, 
when the Government of Indonesia, henceforth government, restored the special status 
for the Aceh Province, absorbed rebel members into the Indonesian Armed Forces (TNI) 
or gave them amnesty.  The rebellion changed afterwards into GAM (Free Aceh 
Movement), believed to be driven by both political and economical factors.  Politically, 
the government has never fulfilled its promises to give broad autonomy status to Aceh 
until 2001.  Economically, natural resources discovered in 1971 were the basis for 
industrialization contributing to the Acehnese economy.  GAM’s power has increased 
over time and its strength has escalated after the fall of Soeharto in 1998. 
During 27 years of the GAM’s rebellion, the government has suppressed the 
insurgencies by various policies without being able to put down the rebellion.  The first 
and second GAM emerged during President Soeharto’s era (1970s-1980s), in which the 
main approach had been military and has often been accompanied by many human rights 
abuses.  Following the discovery of natural resources in Aceh, the policy of the central 
government of sending most of the revenues to Jakarta was the reason for creating 
dissatisfaction among the Acehnese.  Economic marginalization exacerbated resentment 
of the local population in the industrial-site neighborhoods.  The government crushed the 
first rebellion easily since there were only a few hundred rebels with old weapons who 
did not have popular support.  Increased support both from outside and inside the country 
made the second GAM stronger.  The government declared Aceh a military operation 
                                                 
1 The History of Aceh, Available at [http://www.thejakartapost.com/special/os_7_history.asp], Accessed 
September 2003. 
2 Professor Michael L. Ross, November 7, 2002, Resources and Rebellions in Aceh, Indonesia, Department of 
Political Science, UCLA, Prepared for the Yale-World Bank Project on “The Economic of Political Violence”, p. 10, 
Available at [http://www.polisci.ucla.edu/faculty/ross/ResourcesRebellion.pdf], Accessed August 2003. 
2 
zone, known by the Indonesian acronym DOM, in which the Indonesian military 
confronted the rebellion with anti-guerilla tactics.  At the end of DOM in 1998, besides a 
great number of casualties, the legacies of DOM were more grievances among the 
Acehnese toward the central government and popular support for the GAM.  The worst 
consequence was the success of the GAM in creating an image with the majority of 
Acehnese that the government and military, sometimes represented by Javanese, are other 
colonialists in their resources rich land.   
Post-Soeharto governments have introduced alternative approaches by offering 
autonomy and initiating peace talks.  President Habibie admitted the mistakes of the past 
and promised to redress them.3  His government formulated laws that offer greater 
autonomy to Aceh.  As he only ruled for a very short period (May 1998-October 1999), 
the law was never effective and his promises were never fulfilled until he resigned.   
President Wahid’s government, in power almost as long as the previous 
government (October 1999-July 2001), initiated peace talks with the GAM and used the 
Henry Dunant Center (HDC) as a mediator.  His efforts resulted in a series of 
negotiations between the GAM and the government.  His successor, President Megawati 
initially continued the negotiations.  During the negotiations, President Megawati granted 
autonomy status to the Aceh Province in December 2001 under Law No. 18/2001.  In 
December 2002, the negotiations resulted in the development of a Joint Security 
Committee (JSC) to monitor the peace process.  With such good prospects, a group of 
donor countries held a conference in Tokyo to design a reconstruction plan for Aceh.   
Unfortunately, the realities in the field did not coincide with diplomatic efforts on 
the table.  Besides reported violations of both parties, the JSC was in an unsafe 
environment to carry out their jobs.  It is not easy to ascertain the real facts since there is 
no final report from the JSC during their tenure.  From the perspective of the Indonesian 
government and military, the security escalation in the Aceh Province had reached a stage 
that could not be tolerated.  As the last negotiations in Tokyo failed in May 2003, the 
government announced an “integrated operation” including military force, and declared 
Aceh a military emergency zone. 
                                                 
3 ICG Report, June 12, 2001, Aceh: Why Military Force Won’t Bring Lasting Peace, p. 3. 
3 
Before the operation began, foreign journalists and observers warned that 
launching a military operation was not the correct decision.  During the first three months 
of the operation, independent national and international agencies criticized the Indonesian 
military and government policies.  From my point of view, the military operation 
launched by the government is necessary and must be done in a more professional and 
appropriate way.  Although necessary, the military operation is not yet sufficient to 
restore a sustainable peace in Aceh.   
Collier finds that economic agendas are more important than grievances with 
respect to the causes of civil war.  Conflicts are far more likely to be caused by economic 
opportunities than by grievances.4  Collier and Hoeffler suggest that a resource such as 
wealth, as in Aceh, increases the likelihood of civil war because it presents rebel 
organizations, such as the GAM, with an opportunity to fund themselves through looting 
and extortion.5  Although Ross supports Collier and Hoeffler’s findings, he explains 
further and slightly differently that the greed factor would end up with the grievance 
factor.  
On the other hand, Kriesberg describes four interdependent conditions between 
two parties that could lead to a conflict as a result of grievances.  Dixon, who develops a 
theory of the causal links between severe environmental scarcity and violence and Stein, 
who explains a creation of enemy images that engenders grievance and over time 
prolongs and intensifies a conflict, establish other useful explanations of conflict in Aceh.  
Dixon finds that environmental scarcity can contribute to civil violence, including 
insurgencies and ethnic clashes.  Environmental scarcity is caused by the degradation and 
depletion of renewable resources, the increased demand for these resources, and/or their 
unequal distribution.  These three sources of scarcity often interact and reinforce one 
another.6  Following her explanation, Stein develops three possible strategies to manage 
and reduce the conflict caused by hostile enemy images.   
 
                                                 
4 Collier, Paul, The World Bank, April 10, 1999, Doing Well Out of War, NS-3042 Course Documents, Available 
at [http://nps.blackboard.com/courses/1/NS3042_Mr/content/_105717_1/econagendas.pdf], pp. 1-4, 13-14, Accessed 
August 2003. 
5 Michael Ross, University of Michigan, Natural Resources and Civil Conflict: Evidence from Case Studies, p. 4. 
6 Dixon, Thomas F., Homer, Princeton University Press, 1999, Environmental, Scarcity, and Violence, p. 177. 
4 
B. IMPORTANCE OF THE THESIS 
Since the fall of Soeharto, Indonesia has entered a transition period from an 
authoritarian to a more democratic government.  East Timor independence exacerbated 
separatist movements in Aceh and Papua and placed the unity of Indonesia at risk.  At the 
same time, the government is struggling to recover its economy and establish good 
governance.  The government is making Aceh a priority because the conflict has 
escalated following the failure of the latest peace agreement.   
Statistical data shows that most insurgencies succeed in winning their wars, either 
by defeating the adversary in the battlefield or on the table.  In other words, only a few 
countries had won their intra-state conflicts.  Experiences from East Timor also show that 
reconstruction in post conflict environment requires a lot of effort, possibly much more 
than merely stopping the war.  The Indonesian government must apply the appropriate 
policy in Aceh by analyzing carefully and honestly the cause of the conflict.  Enriched 
with the lessons learnt from the previous policy as well as from other countries, the 
analysis must be implemented thoroughly with tight control and adequate evaluation.  If 
the government can properly resolve the conflict in Aceh, it will be a model and valuable 
stepping-stone for tackling other conflicting areas, such as Papua, and minimizing the 
desire for self-determination from other regions. 
C. ARGUMENTS 
This thesis will argue that the GAM rebellion is driven more by grievance rather 
than greed and over time, it has become a wicked problem.  As a result, the government 
should resolve the conflict by addressing the causes of the grievances of the GAM 
beyond a military operation with a multidimensional approach.  For that purpose, the 
military and government need to be more professional in performing their jobs with the 
ultimate goal of winning the hearts and minds of the Acehnese.  Achieving this goal 
would separate the people from the rebels and lessen their opportunities to undermine the 
government and military.  The autonomy proposed will not satisfy the demands of the 
GAM, as stated by one of its commanders that autonomy is just too late: “It is like giving 
a toy car to an adult, who already needs a real car.”7  The military operation is necessary 
to restore security, but it is not sufficient to achieve a sustainable peace in Aceh.  
                                                 
7 M. Djali Yusuf, Perekat Hati yang Tercabik, Bond of Torned Heart, Yayasan Ulul Arham, Jakarta, 2002, p. 78. 
5 
Therefore, broader policies include reconciliation, economic reconstruction, as well as 
better governance and participation should have the same priority as the military 
operation.  This may be the last chance because if unsuccessful, the credibility of the 
military and the government will be diminished further.  Moreover, the unity of Indonesia 
is threatened and Aceh, and probably other provinces, would become the same case as 
East Timor. 
D. METHODOLOGY AND DATA COLLECTION 
In this thesis, I will use descriptive, analytical, and prescriptive methods based on 
data on the GAM and the government policies and interrelated factors from books and 
other published materials and the Internet. 
E. CONTENT OF THE THESIS 
Chapter I presents the purpose, major questions and argument of the thesis.  
Chapter II explains the background of Aceh from pre-colonial to the three stages of the 
GAM.  Chapter III discusses different schools of thought about the causes of a rebellion 
and its resolution.  Chapter IV examines the structure of the GAM and the chronology of 
government policies in addressing the conflict in Aceh.  It will explore the GAM key 
actors and possible economical and political domestic and international support.  Chapter 
V examines the possible and more sustainable government policies to address the 
rebellion.  What are the government’s best solutions to address the conflict?  How should 
the government implement its multi-dimensional approach?  Chapter VI presents the 
conclusions and recommendations for the government and military to put down the 
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II. ACEHNESE REBELLIONS 
A. BACKGROUND 
1. General 
The Aceh Province8 is located in the western-most part of Indonesia, in the 
northwestern land of Sumatra, surrounded by the sea from the southwest to the northeast 
and shares a border with North Sumatra Province.  The coastal areas west of the Bukit 
Barisan mountain range are, in general, sparsely populated and desolate.  Here, the plains 
are narrow and the land uneven and hilly with only two towns in this region, Meulaboh 
and Tapaktuan.  The land towards the east of the Bukit Barisan range is more flat and 
fertile, and the largest part of the province's population is concentrated there.  The land is 
dotted with paddy fields and people engage in either agriculture or trade.  The majority of 
the population is concentrated in and around the coastal towns and cities, which leave the 
hinterland almost empty.  Aceh is one of Indonesia's provinces that bears the Special 
Region status (Daerah Istimewa) and is divided into 16 regencies (kabupaten): West 
Aceh, Aceh Besar, South Aceh, Aceh Singkil, Center Aceh, Southeast Aceh, East Aceh, 
Bireuen, Pidie, Simeuleu, Aceh Jaya, Nagan Raya, Southwest Aceh, Gayo Lues; and 4 
cities (kotamadia): Banda Aceh (the capital city), Langsa, Lhokseumawe, and Sabang.   
According to 2001 census data, the population of Aceh is 4.5 million.  The major 
tribes are the Acehnese9, Gayo, Tamiang, and Alas.  Arab, Chinese, European and Indian 
influences were the dominant foreign factors that helped shape modern Aceh.  Indeed, to 
judge by the physical features, it can be seen among many Acehnese that some 
intermixing must have taken place during the centuries of contact with the outside world.  
Some European features, for example, are most commonly found among the people of 
the Lamno region in Western Aceh, while Indian traits can be found among the people in 
coastal towns.  According to local narratives, Islam is said to have arrived at Perlak in the 
year 800.10  Due to this, and to the fact that the province is still substantially Islamic to 
                                                 
8 The official name of this province is Nanggroe Aceh Darussalam (NAD). 
9 Henceforth throughout this paper, I use the term “Acehnese” for the Aceh people as a whole despite the fact that 
Acehnese is only one ethnic group among other ethnic groups in Aceh. 
10 Bowen, John R., Comparative Studies in Society and History, Vol. 31, Issue 4 (October 1989), Narrative Form 
and Political Incorporative: Changing Uses of History in Aceh, Indonesia, p. 683. 
8 
this day, Aceh is also known as Mecca's verandah among Indonesians.  There are very 
few non-Moslems in Aceh and most of them are immigrants living in cities.  The 
teachings of Islam are faithfully practiced in the people's daily lives, and generally imbue 
the local traditions.  Mosques are filled to overflowing with believers on Fridays and on 
other days in which congregational prayers are prescribed.  The Aceh language is 
composed of several regional dialects, or local languages, which are sometimes so 
different from each other that speakers of one may not be able to communicate with those 
of another.  This is probably due to the isolation of many areas because of the existence 
of natural barriers.  Four major language or dialect groups can be distinguished.  In West 
and South Aceh, the dialect is similar to that of the Minangkabau in West Sumatera.  In 
the Kuala Simpang region of East Aceh, the Deli Malay dialect prevails.  In Central and 
South East Aceh, the Gayo Alas dialects, respectively, are spoken. 
2. Pre-Colonial to Independence 
The first Islamic ruler in Aceh, even in Indonesia and Southeast Asia, Peureulak, 
was inaugurated in the year 840.  In 1292, Peureulak is merged into the kingdom of Pasai 
(Pasé), which in turn merges into Aceh Darussalam in 1465.11  It was in the 1520s that 
Aceh grew in significance, and first began to appear as the entity it is today.12  Aceh 
expanded its territory toward the Malay Peninsula and in the 15th century reached its 
zenith during the reign of Sultan Iskandar Muda from 1607 to 1636.  By means of a 
highly successful “absolute strategy” and an ambitious and spectacular policy of 
expansionism, Sultan Iskandar Muda made Aceh the most powerful state in the region.  
By 1620, Iskandar controlled Pahang, Kedah, and Perak on the Malay Peninsula, and he 
even had designs on Java.  Aceh itself was a major center of Islamic scholarship, and the 
“tradition of Atjeh as an Islamic state” began.13  Aceh was ruled by Islamic Shariah law 
and had trading relations with many foreign nations.  Aceh was a lucrative source of  
                                                 
11 Ibid., p. 684 and Aceh's Islamic Kingdom, available at [http://www.info-
indo.com/sumatra/acehislamickingdom.htm], Accessed September 2003. 
12 Tim Kell, The Roots of Acehnese Rebellion, 1989-1992, Cornell Modern Indonesia Project, Southeast Asia 
Program, Cornell University, Ithaca, New York, 1995, p. 3. 
13 Ibid., p .4. 
9 
pepper, which attracted Europeans, initiated by the Portuguese, to Aceh.  When Sultan 
Iskandar died in 1641, Aceh’s “golden age” began to decline and sparked Dutch and 
British efforts to dominate the region.   
The Dutch began their attempt to vanquish Aceh in 1873 and faced four decades 
of war.  It is because of this continued resistance that the assertion was made that ‘Aceh 
never surrendered its sovereignty to the Dutch’.14  The war cost 37,500 Dutch lives and 
70,000 Acehnese lives.  At least four Dutch generals were killed during the battle and 
many of them were fired because of their failure.15  The “foremost theories and tactician 
of the holy war” was Teungku Chik di Tiro of Pidie.  By 1913, “the Dutch could at last 
be said to have conquered Aceh” and the last Sultan Aceh was exiled in 1907.16  A small 
number of Acehnese continued with the guerilla war, but the struggle afterward was done 
politically by developing religious education institutions as well as political parties.  The 
most prominent religious leader was Daud Beureuh, from Pidie.17  Japan arrived in Aceh 
in 1941 to replace the Dutch and their occupation ended after Japan surrendered to the 
Allies in 1945.   
The Indonesian declaration of independence was announced in Aceh on August 
21, 1945.  On one occasion, Teungku Umar Tiro, as the only heir and on behalf of Tiro’s 
family, took an oath of allegiance to the Republic of Indonesia.18  Facing the threat of a 
return of the Dutch to Aceh, as the Dutch did in Java, leaders in Aceh, including Daud 
Beureueh, issued a proclamation declaring the struggle against the Dutch to be a holy 
war, or perang sabil.19 
 
                                                 
14 Christie, Decolonization and Separatism in the Muslim Regions of Southeast Asia, in A Modern History of 
South East Asia, p. 144. 
15 M. Djali Yusuf, Perekat Hati yang Tercabik (Bond of Torn Heart), Yayasan Ulul Arham, Jakarta, 2002, p. 16. 
16 Ibid., p. 8.  In his book, Kell does not explain that the Sultan surrendered, Tippe, Syarifudin, Aceh di 
Persimpangan Jalan (Aceh at a Crossroads), Pustaka Cidesindo, 2000, p. 30, writes that “Sultan and Aceh’s people had 
never given up the sovereignty of Aceh to the Dutch,” while M. Djali Yusuf; Perekat Hati yang Tercabik (Bond of 
Torned Heart), p. 16, writes that “the Dutch captured the Sultan’s wives, which forced him to stop the armed struggle 
and he was willing to surrender on January 20, 1903.”  
17 See Tim Kell, The Roots of Acehnese Rebellion, 1989-1992, Cornell Modern Indonesia Project, Southeast Asia 
Program, Cornell University, Ithaca, New York, 1995, pp. 7-8. 
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the heir of Tiro’s family. 
19 Christie, Decolonization and Separatism in the Muslim Regions of Southeast Asia, p. 144. 
10 
B. THE REBELLIONS 
1. Introduction 
The history of rebellion in Aceh has lasted for decades, although not continuously 
in the form of overtly armed conflicts.  Despite the fact that all events are interconnected, 
every period of rebellion has its own cause, actors, local as well as national influences, 
and the reaction of the central government to the rebellion.  Therefore, I will discuss the 
past rebellions based on these factors and their impact. 
2. The First Rebellion 
From 1946 onwards, the central government of the Republic of Indonesia could 
exercise little influence in Aceh, for the simple reason that from this time on, it was 
struggling to ensure its own survival in the face of increasing Dutch encroachment.  Since 
the Dutch made no attempt to reoccupy Aceh, the region was, in effect, increasingly left 
to its own devices.20  Therefore, Aceh’s loyalty to the central government during this 
period was inspired precisely by the fact that it was free to run its own affairs without 
central interference, and the Acehnese furthermore expected that their region’s “historical 
separateness and its contribution to the national revolution …would be accorded due 
recognition in a future Indonesian state”.21  
Aceh had given abundant economic and political contributions to the central 
government in the nascent years of the independence of Indonesia.  In his speech in front 
of an Aceh mass meeting on June 17, 1948, president Soekarno stated that Aceh is a 
resource region and appealed to the Acehnese to continue to assist Indonesia.  Aceh 
bought two C-47 aircrafts as the first fleet of Indonesian Airways in 1948.  The Acehnese 
also contributed five kilograms of gold to purchase government bonds and US$500,000 
to finance the Indonesian Armed Forces and to build government offices.22  When the 
Dutch captured the capital city of Yogyakarta and seized the top leaders of the Republic 
Indonesia in 1949, an emergency government was established and the center of the  
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government was moved to Bukittinggi.  As the Dutch also attacked Bukittingi, the 
emergency government moved to Banda Aceh with the full support of the local 
government. 
The first disappointment experienced by the Acehnese arose in 1953 as the central 
government cancelled the autonomous status of Aceh by unifying it into North Sumatra 
province.  Until the end of 1952, Aceh had its own military force under the command of 
Daud Beureueh and equally, it had its own trading links that were independent of central 
government control.  Absorbing Aceh into North Sumatra Province not only offended 
Aceh’s amour proper [self esteem], but also destroyed the de facto network of self-
government that had been operating in the late 1940s.23  The regional grievances were 
based on a sense that Aceh, the hero of the revolutionary period, had been marginalized24 
and betrayed.  As a result, a rebellion broke out in 1953 under the leadership of Daud 
Beureueh and it drew widespread popular support.25  Daud Beureueh’s leadership was 
very central since the Acehnese considered him a religious leader as well as a noble heir, 
besides being a formal official government leader.  By the mid-1950s, the war in Aceh 
had settled down into the kind of stalemate where the forces of resistance often have an 
inherent advantage.26  Unable to quell the revolt by force alone, in 1957 the central 
government made Aceh a separate province and two years later the province was given 
the status of “special region”, which accorded it autonomy in the areas of religion, 
customary law, and education.27  Although Kingsbury writes that “from 1950 until 1963 
they claim their goal had been to secede”28, at least I found two reasons that do not 
support the rebel’s claim.  First, although that time was a perfect opportunity to undertake 
their secession, considering the weakness of the central government and the rigidity of 
the Acehnese in the struggle, di Tiro decided to declare Acehnese independence later in 
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1976.  Second, although di Tiro was actively involved in the rebellion, Daud Beureueh 
was the most prominent figure of that time, in which Daud Beureueh chose to spend his 
old days as an ordinary citizen rather than continuing his armed struggle.  Hence, a 
peaceful solution was reached by absorbing ex-rebels into the national armed forces or by 
giving them amnesty.  The nine-year war costs 4,000 lives.29  By 1962, however, the 
honorable surrender of Daud Beureueh brought the rebellion to an end.30   
In conclusion, the first rebellion was merely driven by the feeling of injustice and 
undermining of the Acehnese as the central government merged Aceh with the North 
Sumatra province.  I also believe that the willingness of the Acehnese to withdraw their 
weapons was also motivated by amnesty from the central government.  This also shows 
the loyalty of the Acehnese to their local leader, not only to protract the war, but also to 
end the fight.  The first rebellion ended peacefully as both sides did not have the 
capability nor demand to continue fighting while the amnesty provided by the central 
government was an invaluable incentive for the rebels to return to their normal lives. 
3. The First GAM 
The development policy of Aceh changed dramatically when massive reserves of 
natural gas were developed in North Aceh in 1971.  Prior to the discovery of natural gas, 
the economy of North Aceh had been based primarily on peasant agriculture and fish-
farming, and the inhabitants were woefully unprepared for the arrival of a modern 
industrial complex.31  To exploit them, Mobil, later ExxonMobil, invested several billion 
dollars in developing the gas fields, constructing a compression plant, and building roads, 
a port, and a new community for the plant’s 5,000 to 6,000 permanent employees.   
The beginning of the rebellion in Aceh in 1976 is linked to the province’s 
resource wealth in two ways: the resource boom produced rapid development in, and 
migration towards, a very poor region, which created grievances that led to rebel support; 
and the province’s wealth gave citizens an economic incentive to secede from Indonesia.  
There are several pieces of evidence that the rebel movement was in part motivated by 
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resource exploitation.  It emerged at the same time that Aceh’s natural gas facility was 
coming on line.  The facility, and the surrounding industrial complex, was the site of 
several of the group’s initial military action, and the movement strongly denounced the 
central government for appropriating Aceh’s resource wealth. 
If in the first rebellion, di Tiro only assisted Daud Beureueh, this time he took full 
control of the rebellion.  Di Tiro secretly returned to Aceh on October 30, 1976 and 
recruited a cadre of young intellectuals, attempted to gain Daud Beureueh’s endorsement, 
and issued a unilateral “Declaration of Independence of Acheh-Sumatra”.32  From this 
point, he directly led his followers to armed insurrection toward the central government.  
Some authors suggest that di Tiro’s movement was driven by anger and hatred as his 
proposal to take part in oil projects was rejected33 and he claimed that his brother was 
“murdered by Javanese military intelligence ‘doctors.’“34  Although his popularity among 
his followers as well as many ordinary Acehnese was undeniable35, an Acehnese 
observer describes him as an opportunist.36  Above all, I believe that he is absolutely the 
most important person who created and nurtured the GAM and has become one of the 
most wanted persons by the central government since then.   
In its 1976-79 incarnations, the GAM was small and engaged in few military 
activities.  It never controlled any territory, and estimates of its active membership range 
from two dozen to two hundred, and some of its fighters were apparently forced to join 
the movement.  They possessed only a “few old guns and remnants from World War II”, 
and extorted money from townspeople to support their efforts.37   
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The central government’s initial response was muted and became more robust 
after the GAM attacked pipeline personnel resulting in the death of an American.  The 
Army Special Forces were sent to Aceh and di Tiro and the GAM then had to go on the 
run.38  By the 1980s, the GAM had effectively disappeared.  Its activities lasted barely 
two years and attracted only a handful of backers.  It was chronically short of funds and 
arms, and was easily extinguished by government forces.  Although Aceh was the site of 
an earlier rebellion, the GAM was unable to attract the support of the key backers of the 
previous movement.  Many Acehnese may have resented the central government’s 
appropriation of revenues from the LNG facility.  Still, in the late 1970s and early 1980s, 
the Acehnese economy was doing extraordinarily well, which may have undercut the 
GAM’s claims about Aceh’s impoverishment.39   
To summarize, although the exploitation of natural resources was in part inspired 
by the emergence of the first GAM, Hasan di Tiro was the most single key element that 
influenced the rebirth of rebellion during this period.  Therefore, the first GAM was more 
motivated by the grievance factor of the individual Hasan di Tiro and the goal was 
obviously the independence of Aceh to be separated from Indonesia.  It was not a time 
well suited to rebellion40 because, on the one hand, di Tiro as well as his followers, did 
not have credible experience.  On the other hand, the central government easily defeated 
the rebels since it was a very strong power politically, economically, and militarily. 
4. The Second GAM 
Although the GAM was unsuccessful in its first manifestation, it was never 
completely destroyed by Indonesian government forces.  During the 1980s, a number of 
fighters remained in the forests of Aceh and the recruitment of both combatants and non-
combatants continued.41  From his exile in Sweden, di Tiro commanded his followers in  
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Aceh by sending “recorded speeches and writings”.  Furthermore, he searched for 
external political and military support and opened GAM offices in Malaysia, Singapore, 
Australia, the United States and Europe.42 
From the outset, the GAM was more aggressive in 1989 than it had been in 1977, 
reflecting both its larger size, and the military training of its members.  It also engaged in 
more symbolic activities, distributing leaflets and burning a school after the headmaster 
was told to stop teaching Pancasila, the official ideology of the Indonesian state.  The 
GAM’s activities were more widespread geographically than they had been a decade 
earlier, but they were still concentrated along Aceh’s northeastern coast, in the districts of 
Pidie, North Aceh, and East Aceh.  North Aceh was also the home of the natural gas and 
industrial facilities, near the town of Lhokseumawe, and both North Aceh and East Aceh 
had been sites of the 1988-89 anti-corruption protests.  Many observers suggested that the 
rebellion was inspired by grievances around Lhokseumawe facilities, including disputes 
over the distribution of high-paying jobs and revenues, official corruption, and concerns 
about the un-Islamic behavior of non-Acehnese migrants.  Estimates of the GAM’s 
strength in 1989-91 range from 200-750 active members.  Although Libya had provided 
training, it did not offer the GAM any additional funds or weaponry.  Some money was 
apparently raised among the Acehnese living in Malaysia.  The GAM also stole, or 
perhaps, purchased, weapons from Indonesia security forces, obtaining some 200 
automatic rifles and light machine guns by June 1990.43 
Until mid-1990, the government responded to the attacks on its forces in a 
relatively low-key manner, relying solely on the troops already stationed in Aceh.  The 
organization’s strength in some parts of North and East Aceh became apparent in August 
1990, soon after the army had begun counterinsurgency operations in earnest.  Prior to 
the large-scale deployment of Indonesian troops in Aceh in mid-1990, the GAM had been 
able to establish such a presence in part by exploiting a lack of governmental authority in 
rural areas.  Local officials were out of touch with the village population, allowing the 
separatist movement to fill the resulting “vacuum” with both its people and its 
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propaganda.  The GAM appears to have benefited not only from a paucity of civil 
authority but also from the active assistance of some village administrations.  However, a 
far more serious threat to the Indonesian government, and an even greater boon for the 
GAM, came in the form of dissension in the Indonesian armed services themselves.  As 
well as drawing the support of some village officials and members serving in the armed 
forces, the GAM appears to have had the active allegiance of deserters, discharged and 
retired servicemen, veterans of the Darul Islam struggle of the 1950s, and the people from 
all strata of Acehnese society.44  A deserter with the rank of corporal named Robert 
disabled armed service members who were carrying out social activities and stole 18 
rifles in 1989.45  The Indonesian government has accused members of Banda Aceh’s 
intelligentsia of being the “brains” behind the activities of the GAM, but it is 
questionable whether such people have been part of the movement’s command structure 
or have given it their active support.46 
The activities of the Free Aceh Movement provoked a brutal response from the 
Indonesian military.  In July 1990, an estimated 6,000 troops were deployed in Aceh, 
bringing to around 12,000 the total number of soldiers in the province.47  From this point 
forward, Aceh was regarded as a “DOM” (Daerah Operasi Militer, “area of military 
operations”), a designation that has no fixed definition or legal status but implies that the 
military has a heightened level of authority and can conduct its operations with 
impunity.48  ABRI’s [former name of TNI] strategy in Aceh centered on the use of 
“shock therapy,” a campaign of terror designated to strike fear in the population and 
make them withdraw their support for the GAM.  Although the separatists themselves 
were widely reported to have committed atrocities, there was “a vast difference in scale” 
between the two sides in this respect.49  A report by Indonesian lawyers in November 
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1990 said that “the whole community” deplored the armed force’s actions, and that “their 
hatred and fear of ABRI” had reached a peak.  Military personnel drafted in from outside 
Aceh were ignorant and neglectful of local customs and traditions, thus heightening the 
level of popular antipathy.50  On the other hand, over the last two years, an estimated 
50,000 transmigrants, who came as part of Suharto’s [national] transmigration program in 
the 1980s and 1990s, were terrorized into leaving their homes in North, East, and Central 
Aceh.  In September 1999, The Jakarta Post reported that thousands of Javanese 
transmigrants were fleeing North Aceh following harassment by the GAM including 
terrorization, extortion, and arson.51 
Kell points out that one of the central elements of ABRI’s counterinsurgency 
strategy was the creation of village militias, which would help the army in its operations.  
In mid-1991, Ibrahim Hasan put their total strength at around 60,000 people.  
Rudimentary training was provided, but the Indonesian military took the precaution of 
arming the militiamen only with primitive weapons such as bamboo spears, not with 
firearms.52 53  Schulze explains that these militias were local defense groups of ethnically 
mixed villages and Javanese areas as they had been targeted by the GAM.  These groups 
were established following the withdrawal of the non-organic TNI (the reinforcement of 
existing troops from outside the Aceh Province), which left the villagers feeling 
vulnerable.54 
Village residents in Aceh were also drawn into the army’s “Integrated Territorial 
Activities Program,” a civic action operation described as part of ABRI’s “war for the 
people’s hearts”.  Launched at the same time as the military onslaught in 1990, the 
program was concentrated in areas where the GAM had a strong presence, and consisted 
of the construction of village facilities and infrastructure.  Rural development funds of a 
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certain size were no longer put out to tender, but instead were handled directly by the 
military and local government authorities in charge of the program.  A further element of 
these activities was “mental upgrading,” aimed at engendering a sense of national 
awareness and patriotism.55 
Nevertheless, the Indonesian forces succeeded in their primary objective of 
neutralizing the military threat posed by the GAM.56  The government’s response was 
successful in the short term.  By the middle of 1991, the GAM’s activities were reduced 
to a minimum, and by the end of 1991, many of GAM’s field commanders had been 
captured or killed.  However, the costs of the government’s response in human rights 
violations was immense, and the government’s brutality produced a deep-seated 
antipathy towards the government and heightened support for Acehnese independence, 
and ultimately, contributed to the GAM’s third incarnation in 1999.  Independent 
estimates of the death toll during the 1990-1992 period range from just under 2,000 to 
10,000.  The vast majority of deaths was caused by the government.  Although human 
rights violations continued after 1993, only a handful of additional deaths were 
recorded.57  According to the International Crisis Group, the number of casualties from 
the conflict between 1990 and 1998 was 1,000-3,000 killed, 900-1,400 missing and 
presumed dead, 500 maimed, and 700 dwellings torched.58   
In sum, while in exile, Hasan di Tiro succeeded in recruiting, training, and 
developing a stronger second GAM using foreign assistance and diasporas with the 
objective of secession.  The GAM received support from the Aceh population as a result 
of the resentment felt toward the central government and security forces, while previous 
factors, such as the scarcity of job opportunities and impoverishment became worse.  The 
major cause of the population’s resentment was the injustice of revenue sharing, bad  
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performance, corruption, and the defection of the military, and anger related to military 
and police atrocities.  The greed factor was not on the rebel’s side, but on that of the 
government and military by keeping the economic incentives concerning Aceh resources. 
5. The Third GAM 
Although the GAM appeared to have been defeated militarily by the mid-1990s, 
the underlying economic and social grievances that made it popular had not been 
resolved by 1998.  This was immediately evident, when, with the fall of Suharto, the 
Acehnese of diverse social backgrounds began to express their views openly again.  
Along with Aceh’s reliance on natural resources, Aceh’s conflict risk increased sharply in 
1999, largely due to four developments: the economic crisis, a referendum on 
independence in East Timor, the proximity of the 1989 military operation, and the central 
government’s decline in credibility.   
East Timor’s referendum was held in September 1999 and in the following 
month, there were massive rallies across Aceh in support of a similar referendum.  In 
March 1999, Suharto’s successor, B. J. Habibie, visited Aceh and pledged to aid the 
region’s economy, to help children orphaned by the war against the GAM, and to 
establish a commission to examine human rights abuses by the security forces.59  The 
promises went unfulfilled and only encouraged secessionist sentiment60 and abated the 
central government’s credibility.61  The arrival of the Wahid presidency in October 1999 
brought little relief even though the president declared that he would personally deal with 
the conflict in Aceh.  Wahid had attended a ceremony only a month before his election in 
Aceh to launch the campaign for a referendum to give Aceh the option of independence 
or autonomy.  Once in his office, however, he was prevailed upon to rescind that 
option.62 
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The Acehnese, hence, had little reason to believe that the government’s offer of 
regional autonomy would be kept.  The discovery of a lot of evidence about the military’s 
brutal legacy during the 1990-98 conflict made a renewed conflict more likely, due to 
widespread antipathy towards the Indonesian military.  It also provided the GAM with a 
pool of willing recruits who aspired to take vengeance on the military.63 
In early 1999, the GAM reappeared and began to grow more quickly than it ever 
had before.  By July 1999, it reportedly had more than 800 men under arms, equipped 
with assault rifles and grenade launchers.  Two years later, the GAM had 2-3,000 regular 
fighters, and an additional 12-24,000 militia members.  It was reportedly in control of 80 
percent of Aceh’s villages.  The main cause for the GAM’s successful re-emergence may 
be the sharp change in public opinion about Aceh independence, caused by the factors 
outlined above: the economic crisis, which made independence and the retention of LNG 
revenues, seem more attractive, the revelations of human rights abuses, and the 
government’s low credibility.  This shift in public opinion made it easier for the GAM to 
recruit new members, and perhaps, to raise funds.  At first, the GAM used force to 
conscript new members.  Over time, however, it began successfully to recruit the children 
of people who had been killed or tortured by security forces under the DOM; offering 
them the opportunity to avenge their parents.64 
The third GAM poses a greater threat to the central government as it has a more 
structured civilian administration and paramilitary organization and an ability to collect 
taxes.  They divided Aceh into several bureaucratic and military regions with appointed 
leaders and commanders.  The recruitment system for the paramilitary has been well 
established, which can be seen from three generations of fighters and the continuation of 
armed resistance even after the death of Panglima AGAM, the military wing of the GAM, 
on January 2002. 
C. CONCLUSION 
In conclusion, in four Acehnese rebellions during the past 25 years, the central 
government was only able to resolve successfully the conflict during the first one.  In the 
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last three stages of the GAM, the central government policies not only failed and 
worsened the conflicts, but also caused the GAM to grow stronger.  Military-heavy 
options chosen by the central government were only able to eliminate lower level GAM 
members or sympathizers with a high cost impact of civilian casualties.  On the other 
hand, the last negotiation offered by the government was misused by the GAM to 
strengthen their power.  Additional factors leading to the re-emergence of the last stage of 
the GAM’s boost in its spirit for struggle were unforeseen major changes in politics and 
the economy, which led to a national economic crisis, a less authoritarian central 
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III. THEORIES ON GREED AND GRIEVANCE OF REBELLION 
AND THE RESOLUTION 
A. INTRODUCTION 
A useful conceptual distinction in understanding the motivation of civil war is that 
between greed and grievance.  Greed motivated conflicts mostly occur in resource-rich 
regions, where the adversaries try to occupy the resource.  On the contrary, injustice, 
ethnic hatred, and revenge may cause grievance-motivated conflict.  Understanding the 
cause of conflict in Aceh is crucial, as it will become a fundamental principle in 
determining how to resolve the dispute.  In this chapter, I will discuss the conflict in Aceh 
by using a greed and grievance approach as a theoretical framework to address the 
conflict. 
B. GREED MOTIVES 
Collier finds that economic agendas appear to be central to understanding why 
civil wars begin.  Conflicts are far more likely to be caused by economic opportunities 
than by grievance.  If economic agendas are driving conflict, then it is likely that some 
groups are benefiting from conflict and that these groups, therefore, have some interest in 
initiating and sustaining it.65  Accepting the findings of Collier and Hoeffler, Michael 
Ross studies the correlation between resource wealth and civil conflict and finds that 
resource extraction may contribute to civil conflict by offering rebels the opportunity to 
loot, and by creating grievances that exacerbate separatist tendencies.66 
Colliers’ finding corresponds with the ICG report which explains some 
possibilities of TNI economic interest in Aceh:   
…For example, timber companies see advantage in employing former 
military officers to supervise their legal and illegal activities, and military  
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backed businesses gain leverage in obtaining contracts because of the 
army presence and its ability to protect these business activities from other 
predatory forces.67 
…ExxonMobil in Lhokseumawe, for example, pays the Indonesian state 
oil company, Pertamina, for limited logistical support to the approximately 
1000 security forces assigned to protect the Arun gas fields.  This support 
includes some vehicles, accommodation, food, water, fuel and a small 
stipend for individual soldiers. …  Continuing hostilities create an 
atmosphere of uncertainty and insecurity.  The vulnerability of the 
Lhokseumawe industrial complex and other industrial and commercial 
centres to attack by GAM makes their managers feel the need to seek 
additional security by paying local commanders to deploy soldiers to 
protect their enterprises.  It can, therefore, be in the interest of the military 
if AGAM activity –within limits– continues in these areas.68   
Michael Ross’s finding about the rebel’s opportunity to loot also corresponds to 
conflict reports in Aceh.  It has been known that local taxes on individuals and business, 
crime, as well as the cultivation of marijuana and trade supports funding of the GAM.  
One of the GAM’s Panglima Sagoe, who was captured by the military and police in a 
recent military operation, admitted that his members have raised funds by extorting 
money and collecting taxes from villagers.69 
Furthermore, Collier states that when the main grievances, inequality, political 
repression, and ethnic and religious divisions, are measured objectively, they provide no 
explanatory power in predicting rebellion.  These objective grievances and hatreds simply 
cannot usually be the cause of violent conflict.  They may well generate intense political 
conflict, but such conflict does not usually escalate into violent conflict.  By contrast, 
economic characteristics, dependence on primary commodity exports, low average 
incomes, slow growth, and large diasporas, are all significant and powerful predictors of 
civil war.70  Both Collier and Ross arguments can explain the cause of Aceh’s conflict in 
different stages.  In 1980s, Aceh’s economy was stagnant, and Aceh’s poverty rates were 
                                                 
67 ICG Asia Report No. 17, June 12, 2001, Aceh: Why Military Force Won’t Bring Lasting Peace, p. 12. 
68 Ibid., p. 13. 
69 Serambi Indonesia, June 4, 2003, “Panglima Sagoe mulai buka mulut (Sagoe Commander Started to Speak)”, 
Available at [http://indomedia.com/serambi/2003/06/040603h10.htm], Accessed September 2003. 
70 Paul Collier, Economic Causes of Civil Conflict, in Chester A. Crocker, Fen Osler Hampson, and Pamela Aal 
(eds), Turbulence Peace, United States Institute of Peace, 2001, p. 161. 
25 
among the lowest in the country,71 Indonesia’s national economy was dependent on 
natural resource exports with its resource exports-to-GDP ratio peaking at .252 in 
1980,72, and a large number of Acehnese lived in Malaysia.  Therefore, Collier’s 
argument emphasizing an economic factor may support the emergence of the second 
GAM.  Ross’s argument corresponds to the last development of the GAM as it gives 
GAM’s members reason to loot as previously explained and as it also creates grievances 
that will be the next topic of discussion.   
C. GRIEVANCE MOTIVES 
The greed of rebels is just one of many mechanisms that can account for a 
correlation between natural resources and conflict.  There are many possible explanations 
between natural resources and conflict that do not imply that civil war is typically a result 
of greed.  Natural resource dependence could, in fact, be associated with grievances 
rather than greed.  Countries with middling levels of dependence on natural resources 
may be experiencing transitory inequality as part of the development process.  
Alternatively, extraction may produce grievances through forced migration.  Or finally, 
natural resource wealth may be seen as more unjustly distributed than other wealth.  
Different explanations require different sorts of policy responses, beyond export 
diversification and cutting off rebel financing.73 
A conflict emerges when members of one or more potential conflict parties 
develop a shared identity, generate a sense of grievance, form a goal that another party, 
being responsible for the grievance, is changed, and come to believe that they can bring 
about that change.74  The first condition is that the parties to the conflict think of 
themselves as entities separate from each other.75  The central government and the 
military believe that they guard the unity of the country and generally agree that the 
GAM is a separatist movement that must be crushed.  Some Indonesian politicians 
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analogize that the GAM is a naughty child in a family who should have his ear tweaked 
to behave properly, but some hawkish government officials insist that the GAM should 
be completely eradicated.  The GAM’s position is quite clear regarding its ideology as 
one of Acehnese nationalism and national liberation.  It is ethnic and exclusive, drawing 
in particular on the Malay culture of its original support base, suku (tribe) Aceh, which is 
only one of nine suku in the province.76  The GAM exclusiveness is also driven by pride 
and honor and has consequently “sought to differentiate itself from Indonesian 
nationalism in the fields of history and ethno-cultural identity”.77   
The second condition is that members of a possible adversary group feel 
aggrieved.78  The GAM leadership, in particular Hasan di Tiro, has succeeded in 
indoctrinating his followers to portray Indonesian, and in particular Javanese, as a 
colonialist enemy.  Human right abuses during past years helped the GAM leadership to 
create an enemy image of the Indonesian military.  The GAM simply compare what the 
central government and military have done in Aceh with what the Dutch had done during 
colonial times and conclude that both are the same.  Orphans and widows during years of 
conflict are easy to recruit for pursuing revenge to their fathers and husbands.   
The third condition for a social conflict to arise is that members of the aggrieved 
conflict party develop goals opposing an adversary.79  For the GAM leadership, the goal 
is fully and clearly articulated.  That is, Aceh’s independence, they believe, can be 
achieved by armed struggle.  Despite some factionalizations within the GAM’s 
organization and different thoughts of what kind of state Aceh would be, their common 
driving motivation for independence is disillusionment with Jakarta, hatred for Indonesia, 
and revenge.80   
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The fourth condition is that members of the aggrieved party believe their actions 
can induce the other party to change.81  The GAM always changes its tactics according to 
the conditions in the field.  Besides directly attacking the central government and military 
targets, they have tried to attract and obtain support from the international community.   
These four components are highly interdependent, affecting each other as a 
struggle becomes manifest.  Each component is necessary, but none is sufficient by itself.  
Furthermore, various combinations of different levels of each can result in the initiation 
of a conflict.  Together, they provide the impetus for at least one side to move against 
another, igniting a struggle.82 
D. OTHER INFLUENTIAL FACTORS 
1. Environmental Scarcity 
Besides using greed and grievance as major explanations, I find that 
environmental factors cannot be ignored in explaining conflict in Aceh.  Dixon develops 
a theory of the causal links between severe environmental scarcity and violence.  He 
finds that environmental scarcity can contribute to civil violence, including insurgencies 
and ethnic clashes.  Environmental scarcity is caused by the degradation and depletion of 
renewable resources, the increased demand for these resources, and/or their unequal 
distribution.  These three sources of scarcity often interact and reinforce one another.  
Two kinds of interaction are particularly important: resource capture and ecological 
marginalization.83 
Resource capture occurs when the degradation and depletion of a renewable 
resource interacts with population growth to encourage powerful groups within a society 
to shift resource distribution in their favor.  These groups tighten their grip on the 
increasingly scarce resource and use this control to boost their wealth and power.84  The 
central government policy from the 1970s until the 1990s was channeling almost all of 
the resource wealth to Jakarta.  During the peak production of the natural gas facility, in  
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fiscal year 1989-1999, only about five percent of total export revenue remained within 
Aceh,85 and most of that was in the hands of mid-size enterprises owned mainly by non-
indigenous Acehnese.86   
Ecological marginalization occurs when unequal resource access combines with 
population growth to cause long-term migrations of people dependent on renewable 
resources for their livelihood.87  Between 1974 and 1987, the district of North Aceh, 
which included PT Arun, Mobil’s natural gas facility, rose in population from 490,000 to 
750,000.  Social amenities and infrastructures for workers and job-seekers were severely 
overstretched.  Some 50,000 migrants from other parts of Indonesia had also come to 
Aceh, largely attracted by the oil and gas boom.  Rapid urbanization, the incursion of the 
non-Acehnese, land seizures, pollution, and competition for jobs in the industrial sector 
all contributed to tensions that may have contributed to the GAM’s 1989 incarnation.88 
Dixon identifies three main kinds of conflict that might arise from environmental 
scarcity: simple-scarcity conflict, group-identity conflict, and insurgencies.  Simple-
scarcity conflict is an inter-state resource war motivated by one country’s determination 
to seize another country’s natural resources.  The natural resources could be 
nonrenewable, such as oil, or renewable, such as agriculturally productive land, forests, 
river water, and fish.89  The GAM under Hasan Tiro’s indoctrination believes that they 
are citizens of the State of Aceh that was declared in 1976.  Therefore, they are not part of 
Indonesia to which they refer as another country that came to Aceh to occupy the natural 
resources. 
Group-identity conflicts arise from the large-scale movements of populations that 
can be caused, in part, by environmental scarcity.  As different ethnic and cultural groups 
are propelled together under stressful circumstances, inter-group hostility with a strong 
identity dynamic is often seen.  Group-identity conflicts happen when a population leaves 
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its land of insufficient resources in search of a new place.  A clash of cultures can happen 
if the newcomers and the indigenous population cannot or will not accommodate each 
other.90  In one instance of land appropriation, 400 families were moved to make way for 
the ASEAN Aceh Fertilizer plant, but the resettlement site quickly became deserted 
either because villagers failed to make the transition to new livelihoods or because 
promises of new land were not fulfilled.91   
Insurgency occurs when a group who, through a combination of grievance and 
opportunity, challenge the ruling authority.  Perceptual differences of the treatment of a 
particular group can bring about a group grievance.  Grievance and opportunity can grow 
easily in a suppressed society and can be exacerbated by environmental scarcity.  While 
economic hardship does not relate to violence, people will tend to act more violent when 
they feel there is an unfair economic balance favoring other groups.  Frequently, middle 
income or elite groups, not the poorest group, will initiate the insurgency.  This group 
challenges the ruling government because it cannot see any peaceful way to change the 
situation.92  In Aceh’s case, Hasan Tiro is the middle class or elite group’s leader who 
initiates the GAM’s rebellion and it is hard to imagine the foundation of the GAM 
without his efforts.  However, Hasan Tiro has never tried to challenge the central 
government through political struggle, perhaps because, he had realized that the ruling 
regime might have acknowledged him as an enemy.   
2. Creation of Enemy Images 
Acehnese had undergone decades of struggle against the Dutch.  Even until the 
early years of Indonesian independence, they still had to fight along other provinces to 
prevent the return of the colonials and among themselves in competing for domestic 
power.  The prolonged experience of struggle created an enemy image of colonialism 
within many Acehnese.  Images of an enemy can form as a response to the persistently 
aggressive actions of another state or group.  Once formed, enemy images tend to become  
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deeply rooted and resistant to change, even when one adversary attempts to signal a 
change in intent.  The images themselves then contribute autonomously to the 
perpetuation and to the intensification of conflict.93   
During the 58 years of Indonesian independence, the Acehnese in general had 
only enjoyed peace for about 18 years (1949-1953 and 1962-1976).  Other provinces, 
except Irian Jaya, have never experienced a conflict during these 58 years of 
independence.  Therefore, Aceh has experienced peace for only one-third of the time 
since independence compared to other provinces.  Hasan Tiro easily triggered perpetual 
conflict with the central government with many abuses during military campaigns to 
stereotype the Indonesian military as enemy images of colonialism.  The GAM and 
AGAM statements are riddled with references to the Indonesian colonial forces, the 
Indonesian colonial state, the “plight of the Acehnese people who are still living under 
the boots of Indonesian colonialism,” and that “the current war in Aceh is against 
colonialism of the neo-colonialist regime of Indonesia.”94 
E. ADDRESSING THE CONFLICT 
As conflict in Aceh escalated into an unacceptable stage, in which the central 
government’s credibility as a legal authority was undermined, corrective action was 
unavoidable.  The central government needed to launch an integrated operation in order 
to restore law and order in Aceh.  On one occasion, the Coordinating Minister of Politic 
and Security said that there would be no more negotiations with the GAM.  However, 
based on lessons learnt from the success and failure of previous policies in Aceh, the last 
policy was not sufficient to create a sustainable peace in this fragile region.  Therefore, 
the central government must address a policy beyond the planned integrated operation. 
By comparing the strength of the Indonesian military (40,000 troops and police 
force) and the GAM (5,000 fighters and supporters), I calculate that the military will able 
to restore some law and order in Aceh, and by then, I assume that Aceh would be a post-
conflict environment in need of reconstruction.  A joint project of the Center for Strategic 
and International Studies and the Association of the United States Army issued a Task 
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Framework for post-conflict reconstruction.  The framework tasks are organized around 
four distinct issues areas, or “pillars”: security, justice/reconciliation, social/economic 
well being, and governance/participation.95  Some pillars have already been partially 
covered within the government’s integrated operation.  However, the justice and 
reconciliation pillar has not been fully pursued and the implementation of other pillars 
needs to be adjusted.  Despite the fact that the first rebellion and the last three stages of 
the GAM have various differences, the history of conflict in Aceh shows that the first 
rebellion could have been settled by reconciliation while the subsequent conflicts have 
dragged on until present day.   
After violent outbursts, after campaigns that are episodes within an extended 
struggle, and after a struggle that is waged for decades, conflicts cease and there is an 
outcome.  The outcome may be the basis of new fights but also the foundation for 
integrative relationships.  The outcome of the last failed GAM-government negotiations 
obviously was a new clash between the GAM and the military and more casualties.  I 
suggest that while sustaining military pressure, the central government should keep the 
option for the GAM to talk and reconcile open.  The government’s offering must contain 
several benefits for the GAM, either politically or economically.  At the same time, the 
government needs to prove its willingness to develop the rural community.  This 
community development should include fighting impoverishment and unemployment, 
and taking care of widows and orphans of conflict victims.  
The government and military would not able to resolve the conflict in Aceh 
without the involvement of other areas of society.  The government, military, and people 
have proven their ability to unite on several past important events, namely the struggle 
for independence and the fight against communism.  Aceh’s reconstruction needs 
collaborative96 action from all areas of the community, including the Acehnese and the 
private sectors.   
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Though enemy images are stable, there are conditions that can bring about change 
in these images.  Large amounts of contradictory data, especially when it occurs in large 
batches, are likely to trigger change.  Incremental amounts of data over a period of time 
can also bring about an evolutionary change in attitudes towards the object of an enemy 
image.97  When community development achieves favorable results, it will change the 
hostile image of the Indonesian government and military. 
Furthermore, Stein offers three strategies for managing and reducing conflict.98   
1. Irrevocable Commitment   
When leaders recognize that misperception and stereotyping govern their 
adversary’s judgments as well as their own, they can try to reassure their adversary of 
their benign intentions and to create incentives for conflict reduction by making an 
irrevocable commitment. 
2. Graduated Reduction in International Tension   
The initiator of this strategy announces the beginning of a series of steps to 
deescalate a conflict.  After each step, the initiator offers the other side an opportunity to 
reciprocate in an unspecified manner.  The strategy does not require the initiator to cease 
to act prudently if confronted by actions by the other side to exploit conciliation at the 
expense of the initial defensive capabilities. 
3. Reciprocal Strategy with a Lag in Retaliation and Return to 
Conciliation   
This strategy involves hesitating before either retaliating or conciliating the action 
of the other side.  By allowing a lag to impose itself between these actions, this strategy 
gives the other side an opportunity to correct initial misperception and to engage in 
learning. 
F. CONCLUSION 
Whatever policy the government or military will take, the initial step would be to 
build trust between the government and military on the one hand, and the Acehnese or 
GAM on the other.  If the government and military leaderships possess a strong will to 
pursue these goals and can be convinced to follow this path, they will able to win the 
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hearts and mind of the Acehnese.  Moreover, it will be an added plus for reconciliation 
offered by the government to the rebels.  Overall, collaborative action to develop a 
community will diminish the possible greed factor, while justice and reconciliation are 






















THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK  
35 
IV. THE STRUCTURE OF THE GAM AND THE GOVERNMENT 
POLICIES 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The ancient Sun Tzu says: “Know your enemies then you will able to defeat 
them,”99 while an old Indonesian proverb says: if you do not know each other, how can 
you love each other?  The first is used to conquer and defeat an adversary, while the latter 
is used to create relationships and friendships.  For years, conflict in Aceh has been more 
the former rather than the latter.  During the history of this conflict, the central 
government seems to not necessarily understand the enemy, and then simply called the 
GAM rebels, GPK/B (Gerakan Pengacau Keamanan/Bersenjata=Security/Armed 
Disruptive Movements), separatists, and later terrorists.  This chapter examines some 
aspects of the GAM, such as its charismatic leader, the organization, and the strategy, in 
which they able to parallel the provincial and central government.  This chapter also 
discusses the government policies from the beginnings of the conflict until its latest 
operation. 
B. THE STRUCTURE OF THE GAM 
1. Hasan di Tiro 
As mentioned in the previous chapter, the most prominent figure in the GAM is 
Dr. Muhammad Hasan di Tiro, a descendent of the Tiro families.  Tiro is a district 
located in the Pidie regency, in the northeastern part of Aceh.  He was born in 1930 and 
was the grandson of Teuku Cik di Tiro, who was considered to be of a blue blood family 
in Aceh.  The Acehnese honor Tiro’s descents with heroic prestige as the past six 
members of Tiro’s family were martyred in the struggle against Dutch colonialism.  
Hasan Tiro was educated in the United States at the Department of Public Law and 
Government, Columbia University and the Department of Political Philosophy and 
International Relations, Fordham University.  His scholarly works include over two 
dozen books on the subjects of jurisprudence, history, politics, political sociology, and 
religion with a special concentration on his areas of interest of Southeast Asia and the 
                                                 
99 Sun-tzu, The Art of War, Copyright 1994 by Ralph D. Sawyer, Barnes & Noble Books, p. 179.  The original 
passage is: “Thus it is said that one who knows the enemy and knows himself will not be endangered in a hundred 
engagements…”. 
36 
Muslim World.100  He married an American woman with a son and this marriage, 
according to Ibrahim Alfian, an Acehnese scholar at the Gadjah Mada University in 
Yogyakarta, undermined his position as Walinegara of the Acehnese Kingdom.101  
Although he uses the title “Teungku,” reserved for respected men of Islam, Hasan di Tiro 
cannot by any reasonable measure be described as a religious leader.102  His opinions 
differ from other ulamas in Aceh who issued a statement in October 15, 1945 to be loyal 
to the Indonesian Republic.  His plea to Daud Beureueh, leader of the Aceh first rebellion 
in the 1950s, to support his armed struggle was also rejected.  Hasan Tiro fought with the 
GAM in the jungle during the initial struggle, and later, has commanded the GAM in the 
field from his exile in Sweden.  Obviously, even in his late 70s, Hasan Tiro is still a 
charismatic, powerful, and the most influential figure of the GAM. 
2. Organization 
Over the years, the GAM has succeeded in building its structure of civilian 
government and paramilitary organization.  The organization model represents their 
strategy, trying to confront the central government authority at every level of command 
or bureaucracy.  Similar to the structure of the present government, the lowest level of the 
GAM’s structure is a village led by a geutjhik, who is assisted by a waki (deputy) and 
counseled by four tuha puët (eldermen).  The respective structures of the upper hierarchy 
are mukim, sagoe, and nanggroe, ultimately responsible to the Wali Negara (Head of 
State), which has been Hasan Tiro himself.  This civilian structure is shadowed by an 
AGAM (Angkatan GAM=military wing of GAM) paramilitary structure.  However, the 
exiled leadership is in overall command of the operations on the ground, which allows for 
the emergence of a by-pass mechanism from Sweden to the regional command (panglima 
wilayah) or vice versa.  The GAM and AGAM/TNA (Tentara Nasional Aceh=Aceh 
National Armed Forces) can effectively be divided into four broad categories: the 
ideological hard-liners who favor military action, the ideological moderates who prefer 
dialog and referendum, the broken-hearted (sakit hati) GAM who want revenge, and the 
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“economic” GAM who are driven by the desire for financial gain.103  Being divided into 
categories does not mean that they fight separately.  They are joined by a similar 
challenge: confront Indonesian authority. 
3. Strategy 
Basically, the GAM has been using the principles of guerilla strategy and tactics.  
The GAM is very confident with these strategies and tactics as they know that it has 
worked for 27 years.  Sun Tzu’s lessons relates to guerilla tactics and states: “All warfare 
is based on deception; if they are united, cause them to be separated; attack where they 
are unprepared; go forth where they will not expect it; if they are strong, avoid them.”104  
The GAM uses exactly the same tactic as stated by its commander and members:  
When they advance, we retreat; when they leave, we return.  When they 
grow tired or weak or careless, we attack.  We don’t have to win the war, 
we only have to stop them from winning.105   
The GAM’s insurgency is dedicated to the destruction of the existing political or 
social or economic system.  Although not intended to win the war, the GAM insurgency 
actions have had certain obvious military objectives: to obtain weapons, ammunition and 
supplies, and to inflict casualties.  Instead of winning the war, the GAM strategy focuses 
more on psychological and political objectives by weakening the morale of the 
government and its soldiers, strains the financial resources of the regime, and increases 
political pressure on it by creating widespread apprehension and dissatisfaction with the 
progress of a war in which there is no progress, and no end in sight.  Besides mobilizing 
domestic support and learning from the success of East Timor, the GAM has pursued 
foreign and international support.  According to its strategy and tactics, the GAM has 
been implementing several steps to achieve their objectives. 
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a. Destruct Political and Social Structure of the Existing 
Government 
The GAM uses intimidation and ultimatums to force people to not support 
the formal government.  The GAM controlled or influenced 80% of the villages in Aceh 
in 2001106 and tried to repeat a similar strategy in 2002.  During the conflict, 150 village-
level government employees were murdered, and another village head was killed even 
during the “Integrated Operation.”107  In 2003, 76 village heads issued a written 
statement to resign from their jobs, because they had been warned and felt that their lives 
were threaten by the GAM108.  The GAM assumes that the formal government education 
system has been corrupting the Acehnese younger generations and the only way to halt 
that process is by destroying schools.  The GAM accused the TNI of committing the 
arson, but the police captured a suspect who confessed that he, along with 14 others, were 
ordered and would be paid by the GAM to burn the school.109  Over the past four years, 
some 50 teachers have been killed and 200 others have been physically assaulted,110 603 
schools were burned111 and until this year, the assassination of teachers still occurred.112 
b. Destruct the Existing Economic System 
The GAM has been expressing their grievances about foreign companies 
operating in Aceh and consider the industrial complex to be their legal victim.  This 
vulnerable target, spread over about 80 kilometers and operated by Pertamina and 
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ExxonMobil, including its employees, has been attacked for years.  As a result, 
ExxonMobil had to stop its production in 2001 and has planned to move its operational 
office to Jakarta in 2003.   
c. Assault on the Javanese in Aceh 
In mid-1999, the GAM forced at least 15,000 Javanese, some of whom 
had lived in Aceh since the 1970s, out of their homes.113  In June 2001, violence in the 
ethnically mixed Aceh-Gayo-Javanese areas of Central Aceh, many of whom had been in 
Aceh for generations since the Dutch period, reached unprecedented levels with clashes 
between the GAM and local village defense groups.  An estimated 64 people were killed 
over a two-week period, of whom 50 were Javanese, which also resulted in the burning of 
an estimated 1,000 houses.114  Statements from all the GAM leadership, including their 
sympathizers on their websites, articulate their deep grievances toward the Javanese that 
is unlikely to be cured.  Their words are colored with insults that tend to be racist.  The 
grievance of the GAM leadership toward the Indonesians, and specifically towards the 
Javanese, trickles down to any GAM members and creates an acute enemy image of 
colonialism, in which the Javanese must be ousted or eliminated from their land.  
d. Weaken the Morale of the Government and Its Soldiers 
Many government employees were also targeted, such as the domestic 
government owned television crew and legislature members.  A large number of 
Acehnese politicians and intellectuals have been killed over the past three years.  One of 
them was Professor Dayan Dawood, head of the Syiah Kuala University in Banda Aceh, 
who was murdered in September 2001.  Before his death, he received a letter from the 
GAM that demanded millions or he would be targeted.115  The GAM has made it clear 
that politicians supporting Jakarta are siding with the enemy and are, therefore, 
considered legitimate targets.116  The GAM has successfully overcome its shortage of 
troops by unpredicted assaults towards off-duty military personnel and police as well as 
their installation.  By retreating to the remote jungle and mountainous areas, the GAM 
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forces over extend the military’s lines so that its communications may be disrupted and 
small units picked off, one at a time, by locally superior GAM forces.  During a four-
month period of the integrated operation, 66 Indonesian soldiers and police were 
killed,117 which means one casualty every two days.   
e. Increase Political Pressure Toward Existing Government 
The central government and the military often see students and NGO 
leaders, who have been outspoken in opposing military operations, as being tools of the 
GAM.  The political groups seem to act side-by-side with armed struggle to oppose the 
central government.  While the military wing confronts the soldier and police, these 
groups apply political pressure on the government and actively campaign to gain the 
support of the local population and Acehnese diasporas.  The largest student organization 
is the Centre for an Aceh Referendum, known by its Indonesian acronym, SIRA.  Formed 
in January 1999, apparently inspired by President Habibie’s offer of a referendum to East 
Timor, the SIRA organized mass rallies in Banda Aceh in November 1999 and November 
2000 to demand a referendum for Aceh.  Although it seemed to be a more “democratic 
and just” way of resolving the conflict by determining the wishes of the people, the 
ultimate goal was the same as the referendum to include an independence option, which 
was also the goal of the GAM.  Some individuals and organizations are still continuing 
the pressure on the government by rallying to commemorate the GAM’s independence 
day118 and supporting GAM’s finances.119  The largest component of the GAM’s strategy 
aims to: first, raise the level of violence that will invite the international community to 
intervene, and second, violence by the security forces will confirm the validity of the 
GAM’s narrative of the conflict and that Aceh’s independence is the only solution.120  
The GAM has welcomed many foreign journalists who visited their compound and then  
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report their struggles to attract the international community.  The last journalist who 
visited the GAM was William Nessen, who stayed with the GAM for weeks and then was 
deported after being sentenced and charged with immigration offences.121 
Ross’s paper explains four strategies of the latest GAM.  The first is a 
propaganda campaign that extols Aceh’s glorious history and suggests a “miscount” 
comparison to Brunei.  The second is to mobilize public opinion against the Indonesian 
government by denouncing, and possibly provoking, military repression.  The third is to 
encourage villagers to move into refugee camps to create a refugee crisis that would draw 
international attention to Aceh, and the fourth is to drive the Javanese settlers out of 
Aceh.122  Regarding the second strategy, a GAM commander made an important 
statement: 
We know from experience how the security apparatus will respond [to our 
activities].  They will kill civilians and burn their homes.  This makes the 
people more loyal to GAM.  And the people in Jakarta and outside can see 
that we are serious about our struggle.  This is part of the guerilla 
strategy.123 
4. Finance124   
The financing for GAM comes from taxes, government funding, humanitarian 
aid, Acehnese diasporas, and some criminal activities.  Considering themselves to be a 
legitimate state in Aceh, the GAM feels that collecting taxes from the Acehnese, called 
pajak nanggroe (state tax), is licit.  An estimated 20% of the central government’s annual 
fund for village development is diverted from each original targeted projected and goes to 
the GAM.125  These two sources have two likely explanations.  First, it is only possible if 
there is cooperation between the GAM and the population, or second, the population 
must contribute as a result of being threatened by the GAM.  The GAM was also 
suspected of siphoning off 50-70% from humanitarian assistance programs that poured 
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into Aceh.  Another source is contributions from the Acehnese diasporas living in 
Malaysia, who number at least 5,000 in Kuala Lumpur alone, including as well Singapore 
and Europe.  There are also finances derived from kidnapping for ransom, extortion, 
general crime, and the profits from the cultivation of marijuana and trade.126   
5. Arms127 
Most observers estimate that the AGAM has between 1,000 and 1,500 modern 
firearms and a few grenade launchers, and even fewer rocket-propelled grenade 
launchers, and perhaps, one or two 60mm mortars.128  The GAM claims it has the 
experience available to make explosives and has used mechanical as well as electronic 
triggers, including cell phones.129  This claim should be accurate as a GAM member, 
Tengku Wahab testified and was ordered to the Labuhan Deli area in Medan to disrupt 
local security in March 31, 2003.130  The GAM purchases its armaments mainly from 
illegal traders.  In 2001 and 2002, Thai police seized 68 AK47, 5 RPD machine guns, 
several grenades, and thousands of AK47 bullets on their way to Aceh.131  The number of 
such that have been successfully smuggled can be much more considering the vast sea 
shore in the Malacca Strait and the Indian Ocean surrounding Aceh.  Adequate 
surveillance of the straights, a traditional avenue of transit between Sumatra and the 
Malay Peninsula, was almost impossible.  In addition, according to an official from the 
ASNLF (Acheh-Sumatra National Liberation Front=GAM's own official name), it was 
not always necessary to buy guns smuggled from overseas.  Although difficult to clarify, 
it was quite possible, he said, to buy Indonesian-made small arms direct from the defense 
department’s own factory, PT Pindad, in Bandung, Java, through corrupt generals.132   
6. International Support 
In his speech on November 13, 1991, Hasan Tiro explicitly stated that the avenue 
for solution in Aceh is the United Nation or United States intervention to sponsor a 
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plebiscite for Aceh’s freedom.133  However, after decades of struggle, the GAM has not 
received enough support from the international community as they had expected.  About 
800 Acehnese are believed to have been trained in Libya in the mid to late 1980s and 
Hasan Tiro stayed there as well to teach the GAM’s version of history and politics.134  
Support from Libya from President Muammar Khadafi to the GAM formally ended when 
President Megawati visited Tripoli in September 2003, in which Khadafi said that he 
backs Indonesian unity and will not help any rebels.135  A further 115 GAM members 
have reportedly been trained in the Philippines by Muslim guerillas in Mindanao and 
some have also reportedly been trained in Afghanistan.136  Thus far, the GAM 
leaderships have enjoyed their freedom in Sweden, where Indonesian authorities have not 
been able to charge them.  Moreover, some human right agencies and independent 
journalists in the United States, Australia, and Europe have supported the GAM by 
attacking every government policy.   
C. THE GOVERNMENT POLICIES  
1. Military Options 
Military operations always cause victims on both sides in addition to civilian 
casualties caught in the middle.  There are also always physical as well as psychological 
damages, displaced persons, and the loss of properties.  Since the first rebellion in Aceh, 
the military option has never been absent from government policies.  The success of the 
military option has varied from time to time, but there have always been casualties and 
damages.  The number of casualties is contested but seems to range between 1,500 and 
10,000 killed.  These data do not include all the cases of rape and torture or reflect the 
trauma and fear of the population.  Most Indonesians, particularly the military, cannot 
grasp these facts by simply stating that it was the consequences of war.  However, 
President Habibie admitted the mistakes of the past and promised to redress them.  Even 
General Wiranto, then Minister for Defense and Security and Commander-in-Chief of the 
Armed Forces, was forced to acknowledge these excesses on 7 August 1998 by 
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apologizing and withdrawing the Area of Military Operations (DOM) status and ordered 
the withdrawal of all troops from outside Aceh by the end of the month.137  Therefore, in 
the history of Aceh, the military operation has always left a legacy of violence, casualties, 
and traumatized victims on both sides as well as civilian victims.  After the failure of 
negotiations in May this year in Tokyo, the government policy was to launch an 
“Integrated Operation”, a security approach supposed to be balanced or followed by 
humanitarian efforts, law enforcement, and governance.  However, the use of military 
force seems to dominate the operation, while only small part of the other components are 
implemented.  The military proposed a budget of 1.23 trillion rupiahs for six months of 
operation138, or around one-tenth of the annual military budget, and since May, it has cost 
the lives of 304 civilians, 63 soldiers and police, and 839 GAM.139  
2. Negotiations and Peace Talks 
Throughout the history of Aceh’s conflict, negotiations took place during the first 
and the last rebellions.  Negotiations during the first rebellion took almost five years 
before a full settlement was attained in 1962.  Several attempts to negotiate and construct 
a peace agreement, however, failed during the last rebellion. 
a. Peace Settlement in the First Rebellion 
During the first rebellion, although the peace formula offered by the Aceh 
Regimental Commander Sjammaun Gaharu initially angered the rebel leader Daud 
Beureueh, he allowed his followers to discuss the formula and continue the negotiations.  
The negotiations produced the Lam Teh Agreement in mid-April 1957, in which both 
parties agreed to cease military and hostile movements while talks towards a permanent 
settlement were under way.140  The Acehnese insurgency was eventually brought to an 
end through a combination of security measures and negotiations, ending in an agreement 
in May 1959 that conferred special status on Aceh, daerah istimewa, autonomy in matters 
                                                 
137 Ibid. 
138 Kompas, May 12, 2003, “TNI Minta Tambahan Dana Untuk Operasi di Aceh”, Available at 
[http://www.kompas.com/utama/news/0305/12/090031.htm], Accessed September 2003. 
139 Kompas, September 24, 2003, “Pengakuan TNI soal 304 korban sipil kemajuan sikap TNI,” Available at 
[http://www.kompas.com/kompas-cetak/0309/24/nasional/578191.htm]. Data from Koalisi NGO HAM (NGO Coalition 
for Human Rights) are 82 civilians, 53 TNI/police, and 220 GAM, Available at [http://www.koalisi-ham.org/], 
Accessed September 2003. 
140 Nazaruddin Sjamsuddin, Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1985, The Republican Revolt, p. 263. 
45 
of religion, adat (customary) law, and education.141  More than 12,000 Darul Islam 
soldiers, bringing with them more than 1,000 arms, had returned by December 1961.142  
Many ex-rebels in Aceh were recruited into the local military units, while many of the 
civil servants returned to their previous departments.143  Even the Commander of the 
Aceh Islamic Armed Forces, Colonel Hasan Saleh, rejoined the Indonesian Armed Forces 
and retained the rank of colonel.144 
b. Negotiation Under President Wahid 
The initiative to talk with the GAM came from President Wahid’s 
administration by inviting the HDC (Henri Dunant Center), a Geneva-based non-
governmental organization.  The result, on 12 May 2000, was the “Joint Understanding 
on a Humanitarian Pause for Aceh” that went into effect in June for three months, which 
was extended in September until January 2001.  A monitoring team, composed of people 
chosen by each side and approved by the other, was created and was supposed to 
investigate violations.145  This agreement eventually dissolved due to two factors.  First, 
each side accused the other of violations and the monitoring team was unable to address 
the violations.  Second, there was a dispute between the central government and the 
GAM over the topics that should be discussed during the negotiations.  As violence 
escalated, President Wahid resisted declaring a state of emergency, but issued 
Presidential Instruction (Inpres) No. 4 on 11 April 2001 instead.  Supposed to be a six-
point plan for ending the conflict, including measures to address political, economic, 
social, legal, public order, security, and information aspects, the Inpres ended up being 
little more than a green light for a new round of military operations.146  At that time, it 
had been known that the relationship between President Wahid and the military was not 
harmonious. 
 
                                                 
141 Schulze, p. 242. 
142 Nazaruddin Sjamsuddin, The Republican Revolt, p. 310. 
143 Ibid., p. 330. 
144 M. Djali Yusuf, Perekat Hati yang Tercabik (Bond of Torn Heart), p. 50. 
145 ICG Asia Report, February 27, 2003; “Aceh: A Fragile Peace?”, p. 2. 
146 Ibid., p. 3. 
46 
c. Negotiation Under President Megawati147 
The Megawati government took office on 23 July 2001 and throughout 
late 2001 and early 2002, major military operations continued in Aceh, even as the 
government pursued new approaches to dialogue.  Three sets of discussions took place in 
Geneva, in February, May, and December 2002.  Both sides again accepted the HDC and 
four foreign advisers were added148 as mediators.  The Cessation of Hostilities 
Agreement (COHA) was to start with a two-month confidence building phase from 9 
December 2002 to 9 February 2002, in which both parties requested that “no party 
undertake any action which is inconsistent with this Agreement and may jeopardize the 
future security and welfare of the people of Aceh”.  A Joint Security Committee (JSC) 
was established on 20 December 2002 with a mandate to monitor the security situations 
and investigate violations followed by a deployment of Thai and Filipino soldiers as 
observers.  Moreover, on 3 December, a group of donors, co-chaired by Japan, the United 
States, the European Union, and the World Bank, met in Tokyo for the Preparatory 
Conference on Peace and Reconstruction in Aceh, anticipating a positive outcome of the 
new round.   
Yet, the general effect of the signing of the Agreement had been 
widespread optimism verging on euphoria throughout the entire province, because the 
Agreement is already perceived to be a peace agreement.  There was a dramatic reduction 
in the incidence of killings in the province.  These positive developments could have 
gained tremendous momentum, but unfortunately, that did not happen.  Instead, the 
process became bogged down, and at one point, it became difficult to see how it could 
still go forward.149 
Indeed, both parties interpreted the negotiations differently.  First, the 
GAM was looking for a formula in which the present acceptance of autonomy would 
leave open the possibility for future independence, while the Indonesian side wanted a 
commitment to autonomy, not as a starting point but as the end point.  Second, the GAM 
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and military interpreted the term relocation of troops differently.  The GAM understood 
the term relocation to mean dismantling all military posts, while government negotiators 
saw “relocation” as only moving posts in peace zones further away if they were too close 
to the GAM posts.  Even the provincial military commander, Major General Djali Yusuf, 
implied that “relocation” was simply a question of changing their posture from offensive 
to defensive.  Third, during the 2004 elections, government officials maintained that 
elections would be held in Aceh under national law, while the GAM prefers to interpret 
“election” as a “referendum”.   
It did not take long before the Indonesian military and the GAM accused 
each other of cease-fire violations.  There were press reports of civilians intimidating 
members of the Joint Security Committee, a charge that the military denied.150  Non-
governmental sources, local parliamentarians, and pro-independence supporters reported 
in late January 2003 that the GAM was conducting a public disinformation campaign to 
promote a public perception that the final result of the implementation of the agreement 
would be independence for Aceh, and the GAM had reestablished administrative control 
over villages that military operations had forced them to leave in 2001.151 
The government registered a strong protest and demanded a meeting with 
the Joint Council, which is composed of high officials of the government, the GAM, and 
the HDC.  There were disputes then about the time and place of the meeting.  When both 
parties finally agreed to meet in Tokyo on 17-18 May 2003, the result was not 
unexpected: the Joint Council in Tokyo failed to reach an agreement.  In his remarks, the 
Indonesian representative Wiryono Sastrohandoyo stated:   
…….let me reiterate and make clear my government's firm position, that it 
is absolutely imperative that the purpose of this meeting is to secure the 
explicit statement of GAM to accept fully the NAD Law within the 
framework of the unitary state of the Republic of Indonesia, and therefore 
abandon its effort for independence of Aceh from the Republic of 
Indonesia, and it will begin to place all of its weapons, ammunitions and 
ordnance, without delay, in accordance with the procedure laid down in  
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the COHA.  lf GAM is willing to explicitly pronounce its statement 
regarding these basic points, then we can proceed to discuss and agree on 
how to resume the implementation of COHA.152 
On the other hand, the GAM spokesman, Baktiar Abdullah, stated that the 
most difficult thing is to be forced to accept autonomy, to dismiss the GAM, and to 
dismiss the TNA.  Aceh has its own history, and they are ready to fight against 
colonialism, while Zaini Abdullah added that they prefer to die than live under 
colonialism, and that is the character of Aceh’s nation.153  
As the negotiations failed, on 6 May, President Megawati announced what 
many Acehnese had been dreading: an “integrated operation” in which the restoration of 
security would be combined with humanitarian, law enforcement, and governance 
elements.154 
3. Autonomy 
The autonomy granted for Aceh in the 1950s, in fact, was never implemented as 
the central government had tightly held its power.  In 1999, President Habibie’s 
government  designed decentralization laws (Laws No. 22 and 25 of 1999) that gave all 
of Indonesia’s regional and local governments extensive powers and enables them to 
retain much of the income from the natural resources in their own region.  In addition, 
Aceh was given Law No. 44 of 1999 that affirmed Aceh’s right to organize its own 
religious, cultural, and educational affairs.155   
In August 2001, President Megawati signed a law that granted “special 
autonomy” to Aceh (Law No. 18 of 2001), giving Aceh control of 70 percent of its oil 
and gas revenues for eight years, after which the arrangement would be subject to review.  
It would also partially implement Islamic law in Aceh, establish Islamic courts, introduce 
direct elections for the province’s governor, and give the governor greater control over 
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the Acehnese police.156  In nominal (current price) terms, the sum of the total revenues 
accruing to the provincial and municipal governments is estimated to increase by over 
150% between 1999/2000 and 2001.157  While this law provides enormous opportunities 
for the future development of Aceh, three critical challenges must be overcome to 
achieve the full implementation on the law.158   
The first obstacle is a lack of provincial regulations to implement the law, e.g., 
direct elections of the governor, regents, and mayors.  This law can only begin to be fully 
effective after the enactment of the multiplicity of provincial regulations, called Qanuns 
in Aceh.  However, the Qanun, in order to define the details of the direct election, has not 
yet been passed by the provincial parliament.   
The second obstacle regarding the special autonomy package is the uncertainty 
over the roles of the governor and the regents.  The existing autonomy law (No. 22/1999) 
gives principal authority to regents and mayors in managing financial and administrative 
affairs, whereas the Law No. 18/2001 gives some of this power to the governor.  This 
uncertainty needs to be resolved through consultation leading to the enactment of the 
appropriate Qanuns.   
The third challenge is to find ways to accommodate regional aspirations such as 
those of the GAM in the formal political system.  The law on political parties does not 
recognize a regional party as a contestant in the general election.  Thus, the fact that the 
GAM’s support base is in Aceh limits its opportunity to form a political party and contest 
an election.  It is difficult to imagine that the GAM would join existing national parties.  
The latest autonomy law does not address this issue either.  Moreover, Article 12 of this 
law says that one requirement for a person to be nominated as a governor candidate is 
that he or she had never been a foreign citizen.  In addition, Indonesian election law says 
only citizens can vote.  This obstacle blocks the opportunity of the GAM’s leaders to 
participate in any political activities, because all of the GAM’s top leaders hold foreign 
citizenship.  The nominal leader, Hasan di Tiro, is a Swedish citizen, the GAM’s Foreign                                                  
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Minister Zaini Abdullah is a Malaysian citizen, and the GAM’s Prime Minister Malik 
Mahmud is actually a Singaporean citizen.  The government gave the Acehnese the 
chance to elect their own leader, but outlawed the elections of “brothers” from outside the 
country.   
The first obstacle can be resolved at the provincial level, while the central 
government must take action to resolve the other two obstacles.  Provincial leaders in 
both the executive and legislative branches must work closely with the central 
government and the national parliament.  Transparency is essential to avoid both the 
reality and the appearance of closed decision-making by political elites. 
D. CONCLUSION 
The leadership, organization, and strategy of the GAM indicate that they are 
driven more by grievance than economic motives.  The leadership sturdily insists on its 
goal for independence and consistently uses its propaganda of a glorious history, a 
prosperous future, and the hated enemy image.  The core organization in exile is solid 
and untouchable and in the field is flexible according to territory occupation.  They use 
any possible strategy, from conventional guerilla tactics to political mobilization, or the 
manipulation of the Acehnese population if necessary.  In fact, based on numbers and 
armaments, the GAM is unable to win a military contest with the government.  The 
GAM, can, however, make the Indonesian government’s effort to crush it painful and 
costly.159  On the other hand, since the first GAM, albeit there was some improvement in 
the last operation, government policies have not significantly changed.  Until the present 
operation, the military operation has dominated government policies and the efforts to 
address other aspects of the Integrated Operation have not demonstrated better results.  
Therefore, the security approach in terms of military operations is necessary to confront 
the escalation of separatist movements and to establish law and order in Aceh.  
Nevertheless, the military itself is not sufficient to resolve the conflict in Aceh, and 
therefore, more than military operations are needed, and by then also, it will be beyond 
the military’s capability. 
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V. GOVERNMENT OPTIONS TO ADDRESS THE CONFLICT IN 
ACEH 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Over time, the conflict in Aceh has become more complex, has multiple-
interrelated causes, and beyond the capability of a single institution to resolve.  It is a 
kind of vicious circle that is difficult to sever, in which one aspect depends on another.  
The Government’s latest options were the launching of an “Integrated Operation” 
consisting of humanitarian aid, law enforcement, consolidation of government 
components, and the restoration of security.  As part of this operation, the government 
declared Aceh a military emergency region for a six month period starting in May 19, 
2003.  This chapter will partly discuss this government option regarding the post-conflict 
reconstruction framework of security, reconciliation, socio-economic rehabilitation, 
governance/participation, as well as other possible options.  
B. USE OF FORCE TO RESTORE SECURITY 
A state has the monopoly on the legitimate use of physical force within a given 
territory.  Of course, force is not the only means at the state’s disposal, but force is a 
means specific to the state.160  Therefore, military force is an important means to 
confront an armed struggle in Aceh that threatens the unity of Indonesia.  With the failure 
of mediation and negotiations in Tokyo in May 2003, the use of military force was then 
unavoidable.  No government in the world will tolerate a guerilla movement on its soil.  
The TNI should provide security in Aceh as it is a prerequisite for the implementation of 
other programs.  Unfortunately, previous experiences have demonstrated that the military 
operation has always had undesirable results.  When confronted with the GAM during its 
first and second phases, the TNI succeeded in providing security only for a short time and 
eventually produced a stronger GAM.  During DOM, the TNI exacerbated the existing 
problem with human right violations.  Under the Security and Defense Law, one of the 
TNI’s duties is to uphold the integrity and sovereignty of Indonesia.  I assume that the 
TNI still places this duty above any other interests.  Therefore, as the success of resolving 
the conflict in Aceh will risk the integrity of Indonesia, the TNI should pursue every 
                                                 
160 Max Weber, Politic as a Vocation, p. 1, NS-3023/Prof. Ziblatt’s Course Materials. 
52 
effort to bring a sustainable peace to Aceh.  In her article, Sidney Jones writes that the 
military will need to avoid repeating the mistakes it has made in the past in conducting 
security operations, if it is going to have any chance of rebuilding credibility and trust in 
Aceh.161  I will discuss some of her suggestions below while stating my own opinion 
which is different from the others. 
1. Improve Soldiers and Police Professionalism 
Improving professionalism can be done with initial training as well as subsequent 
education.  Soldiers must know how, when, why, and who they are to shoot.  They must 
know how to defeat their enemy, protect the mission and themselves.  They must 
understand the rules of engagement.  They should understand the law of war, humanity as 
well as state and military laws.  Every field commander is responsible for explaining the 
overall goal of the operation as well as the strategy and tactics to every single soldier.  I 
assume that every TNI soldier has acknowledged all of those resources.  However, every 
soldier deployed to Aceh must receive specific explanations about the background of the 
conflict in Aceh and the socio-cultural beliefs of the Acehnese.  Without relaxing their 
awareness in the battlefield, they must be reminded that one of their jobs is to protect 
civilians, and therefore, shooting or behaving harshly towards them must be forbidden 
and any such actions reported.  They must also acknowledge that they will be taken to 
military court if they violate the law and break the military code of conduct (Sapta 
Marga=Seven Ways) or the soldier’s oath (Sumpah Prajurit).  Similarly, the police must 
be retrained about specific issues related to special knowledge about Aceh.  The Army 
Chief of Staff explained that discipline issues caused 70% of army casualties during the 
conflict.162  Inspired by that result and in striving for professionalism, the Army has been 
preparing ten army-raider battalions.163 
The TNI leadership has emphasized the importance of the good conduct of soldier 
on several occasions.  During his visit to Aceh, the TNI Commander, General 
Endriartono Sutarto, described a soldier that extorts money illegally from citizens as a 
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traitor.164  Previously, the Aceh Military Emergency Commander stated that he would 
punish the TNI and police members as well as civil servants who supported timber and 
marijuana smuggling from Aceh or were involved in bringing illegal commodities from 
Sabang Freeport to Aceh.165  The messages from the leaderships are very clear that they 
will not tolerate any violations by their subordinates.  
The role of the individual soldier and police as the main actor in the field is 
obvious.  In addition, to be able to perform their duties to the best of their abilities, they 
should have the appropriate equipment.  In a guerilla war, the enemy may confront them 
in unpredictable ways during the day or night.  Therefore, a soldier and the police in a 
combat area should be equipped with a bulletproof jacket and helmet, an infrared guided 
rifle for precision aim, and personal night goggles and binoculars for night operations.  
Troops should able to communicate clearly and easily among themselves as well as with 
their unit or command post with the slightest possibility of the communications being 
jammed or intercepted.  Although an effort was made to obtain this goal by ordering 
5,000 SS-2 rifles from Pindad,166 in fact, the TNI has lacked modern weapons due to the 
limited budget of the military. 
Will skillful and well-equipped soldiers and police guarantee their peak 
performance?  I believe it will not unless their basic needs are fulfilled.  They need to be 
paid adequately to cover their expenses and to take care of their families.  How can 
troops concentrate on their tasks if, at the same time, they have to think about their 
families?  The low salary of military personnel, in addition to the police and civil 
servants, has always been mentioned in many articles discussing the Indonesian Armed 
Forces.  In 1996, Lowrey writes: 
The reality is that most government employees in Indonesia live beyond 
their visible means of support.  Historically, allowing them to pursue extra 
income, whether by moonlighting, by exploiting government assets or by  
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graft and corruption, has been accepted as the way people are rewarded for 
services to the ruler, but the practice causes problems in a number of 
ways.167 
Kingsbury raises the same issue is by stating that “salaries for junior TNI 
personnel do not adequately cover their living costs, especially for those with 
families.”168  Kompas also articulated about the minimum salary and compensation for 
soldiers in the battlefield when the government decided to purchase Russian warplanes 
this year.169  An insufficient budget for the military was even reported in 1957, when the 
military commander of North Sumatra smuggled out thousands of tons of rubber and 
coffee from the port of Teluk Nibung.  The smuggling was said to be justified by the 
concern of local military leaders about their soldiers’ state of welfare, for which funds 
from Jakarta were quite inadequate.170  Albeit the denials from many in the TNI 
leadership, I believe that professionalisation generally is hampered by low pay rates and 
by conditions which meet basic human needs but often fail to satisfy grander personal 
aspirations171 as well as an inadequate military budget.  For almost the last decade, the 
TNI has received an insufficient budget, and in fiscal year 2003, the government can only 
provide one-third of the defense budget proposed by the TNI.  The TNI’s low annual 
budget for years has been eroding its general performance as well as individual capability 
as part of the entire system.  Therefore, the shortfall of the budget has curbed the demand 
to improve soldier and police professionalism.  
2. Reduce Troops As Soon As Possible 
Theoretically, once the security in certain districts or regencies has 
beenestablished, troops shall be withdrawn immediately and leave the duties to the 
police.  The problem in Aceh, and generally for the Indonesian police, is that there are 
not enough police.  In a normal situation, soldiers are usually added to reinforce the 
police.  Since Aceh is under martial law, it is likely that soldiers will be more dominant 
than the police.  However, with the progress of security in most of Aceh, wherever a 
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region is classified as a white area, reducing the number of troops to a minimal number is 
a wise decision as it would economically decrease the cost of war and reduce the 
temptations of troops towards misconduct due to prolonged duties.   
3. Publish Rules of Engagement 
Civilians, not just soldiers, should clearly understand what the rules of 
engagement are, and these should be published in the national and local media and 
disseminated as widely as possible through other means.172  The TNI leadership should 
support and implement this idea, so civilians are able to evaluate the contents and to file a 
complaint or report if soldiers do not follow the appropriate rules.  Assisted by the 
International Red Cross (IRC), the TNI headquarters published a pocket guidance book 
for field operations concerning human rights and international law.173  The TNI may seek 
further cooperation with the IRC to produce and distribute the rules of engagement. 
4. Do Not Use Civilian Auxiliaries or Militias 
In local terms, civilians used by the military are called cuak, while those used by 
the GAM are known as cantoi.  As reported by Kontras, many cuaks have been executed 
while many others have been isolated, as they became enemies of the GAM and their 
victim’s families,174 but at the same time, Kontras did not report any data about cantoi.  
Kompas reported cantoi participated in the present operations as two high school students 
were captured by the military, which they claimed were GAM informants.175  Although 
the GAM has reportedly used informants to receive advanced warnings of attacks, the 
TNI should not do the same.  Not only does this encourage abuse but it also creates long-
term problems with post-conflict reconciliation.176  I discuss some issues about the 
militias in Chapter II as well.  The ICG worried that the TNI would establish militias in 
Aceh again as they reported the presence of militias in Aceh in 1990.177  Kingsbury, who 
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himself made a field trip to Aceh,178 stated that the militia was trained by the Army 
Special Forces and armed with SS-1 rifles179, while Schulze explains this differently.180  
Stating that those militias are not armed with weapons, Kell explains that the purpose of 
the militias was to accompany the army, in which the ordinary villagers would participate 
in sweeps of areas believed to be inhabited by guerillas.181  A different definition about 
the term “militia” seems to have caused foreign journalists as well as some NGOs and 
government to perceive the situation differently.  Journalists and NGOs feel the militias 
in Aceh were trained and used by the TNI to fight the GAM.  On the other hand, training 
and supervising a neighborhood to protect their property and their lives from any threat 
are part of the general duty of the TNI.  It is logical thinking and it is understandable if a 
community decides to protect their own neighborhood and property as long as they do not 
violate the law, for instance, by possessing firearms.  According to Radio Nederland, a 
person from a community in Takengon, among other things, stated:  
We do not have any relationship and do not want to be related with ABRI.  
Like you, we only want peace.  We have never taught, armed, or used by 
TNI.  Journalists only worsen us.   
The Army even burned their firearms on one occasion.182  Nevertheless, under the law, 
protecting the people is the primary job of the TNI and police as well as is training and 
preparing the people for defending the country.   
5. Budget Transparencies 
It is necessary to ensure that the budget and operating expenses for military 
operations are fully transparent to root out possible corruption in the security forces.183  
Although Indonesia has Law No. 31 of 1999 about anti-corruption and recently the House 
of Representatives have been preparing a draft for the Law of Corruption Eradication, 
corruption is widespread in Indonesia.  The lack of transparency is one cause of the very                                                  
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high incidence of corruption in Indonesia and a foreign report places Indonesia 88 out of 
102 countries.184  Teten Masduki, coordinator of the Indonesian Corruption Watch, said 
that at every level, whether it is bureaucratic, political or judicial, corruption is the day-
to-day means to make money.185  Kwik Kian Gie, Minister of National Development 
Plan, stated that KKN, the Indonesian acronym for corruption, collusion, and nepotism, is 
the root of all evils.  Corruption has become more rampant, brutal, and destructive.  KKN 
continues to steal and spread into the minds of the population as well as their culture, 
lifestyle, and values.  Therefore, eradiating KKN must be done immediately not only by 
rhetoric and slogans, but through a tangible plan of action.  He proposed a carrot and 
stick method to fight KKN.  The carrot is an incentive in terms of sufficient net income 
for all state employees, while the stick is a more robust punishment as far as the death 
penalty is concerned.  The anti-KKN program can only succeed, he added, if it is started 
at the highest level of leadership.186  The TNI may also face such a problem.  The BPK 
(Badan Pemeriksa Keuangan=State Audit Agency) reported a large financial 
misappropriation by almost all state institutions, including the TNI.187  Therefore, it is 
unlikely for there to be transparency in the budget and operating expenses for the military 
operations in Aceh.  In fact, the TNI has a good chance to lead a war against corruption 
and encourage budget transparency in Aceh since the TNI Commander acts as the highest 
authority in the military emergency region and holds both the military and civilians 
accountable. 
6. Prosecute Violators of the Law and Military Code of Conduct and 
Soldier’s Oath 
In the beginning of the latest operation, the TNI leaderships stated that they would 
behave different from the previous leadership.  To an extent, a commitment made by the 
TNI leadership has implemented this policy in the field.  Three soldiers from Battalion 
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144 were sent to prison by a military court on June 11, 2003, for beating villagers in 
Lawang, Bireuen188 and three from Battalion 411 were fired and sentenced to jail on July 
19, 2003 after being found guilty of rape in Alue Lhok, North Aceh.189  The TNI 
Commander stated that he will administratively sanction Battalion Commanders who 
cannot control and discipline their subordinates.190  A joint investigation team established 
by the Military Emergency authority has sanctioned police and soldiers at checkpoint 
posts for asking for ‘pocket money’.191  The investigation and prosecution of the 
misconduct of soldiers must be augmented in order to erase some of the TNI’s bad 
reputation that it gained in the past and to successfully win the hearts and minds of the 
Acehnese.   
7. Keep Conduct of Military Operations Subject to Regular and 
Frequent Review by Civilians 
The Indonesian House Representative (DPR-RI) has several rights that it is able to 
invoke to perform their tasks and exercise their authority.  Among these rights are the 
right of interpellation to the president, the right of inquiry, and the right of summons or 
subpoena.  In June of this year, Committee I of the DPR-RI established a Working 
Committee that called a number of government officials, mainly the Indonesian Minister 
of Industry and Trade, to explain the government’s decision to counter-trade military 
aircraft with Russia.  Therefore, whenever necessary, the DPR-RI can do the same thing 
in the case of military operations in Aceh by holding the Indonesian Armed Force 
accountable for its actions.   
8. Use of Mobil Brigade (Brimob) 
The Brimob was accused of having the unenviable reputation towards abusive 
behavior and its members tend to be younger, with less training and experience, than 
soldiers, and their commanders appear unable to prevent their preying on civilians when 
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they are not engaged in combat.192  I suggest that this accusation might be true for some 
units of the Brimob, but not for all.  Despite the fact that the Brimob has weaknesses, it 
possesses strengths as well.  The Brimob’s overall strength consists of 10,000193 and its 
role and capability in counter-insurgency cannot be undermined and therefore, their 
presence is still needed to augment the TNI.  I may agree to reduce their participation in 
the operation, but I do not support the idea of excluding them all as it will significantly 
weaken the strength of the government forces.  By implementing a more robust sanction 
toward disobedient troops, I believe that the Brimob would perform better.  
9. Access for Journalists and Independent Observers 
On June 16, 2003, the Indonesian government issued Presidential Decree No. 43 
of 2003, which states in Section 2 that first, international and local NGO are not allowed 
to conduct any activities against the goals of the State of Emergency with the status of 
Martial Law in the NAD Province.  Second, any humanitarian assistance coming from 
other countries, world organizations, both foreign as well as national in the NAD 
Province, are to be coordinated by the Coordinating Minister for Public Welfare on 
behalf of the President as the Central Military Emergency Authority.194  Repeating the 
steps suggested by Sidney Jones, a Human Rights Watch paper organization recommends 
and asks for immediate and unimpeded access throughout Aceh.195   
The government is unlikely to accept these recommendations anytime soon.  The 
government policy to restrict independent journalists is not new to Indonesian history and 
is driven by past experiences.  The first reason, I believe, is that the government and 
military simply cannot protect the life of foreigners and journalists in such a conflicted 
area as Aceh.  The death of five television newsmen in Balibo, East Timor on October 
16, 1975 had a great impact, even decades afterwards.  One of the cameramen was Brian 
Peters, a Briton working for a Sydney-based television company.  Brian’s loss was 
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dreadful for his family and inspired his sister to investigate and take some actions that 
influenced the British government’s policy towards Indonesia in 1998.196  On September 
6, 2000, in a riot in Atambua, near the border of East Timor, two UNHCR workers were 
murdered.  In its report, Tapol, a UK-based NGO called for the dismissal of the regional 
TNI commander and that more responsibility is given to the TNI leadership in East 
Timor.197  In Aceh, Indonesian soldiers due to miscommunication between themselves 
shot a couple of German tourists.  The man was killed and the woman wounded.198  An 
American journalist was reported to have illegally entered the GAM camp for weeks and 
was trapped between the two conflicting parties.199  The two cases in East Timor 
demonstrated the TNI’s inability to protect foreigners in the conflicted area might 
become a serious problem in the future.  The other two cases in Aceh reminded the TNI 
that the safest way to deal with the foreigners in the conflicted area is to restrict them 
despite the fact that it might restrict their freedom.   
Although security is necessary and paramount as a precondition before the 
subsequent phase of reconstruction, unfortunately, the TNI has never gained an outright 
foothold in Aceh.  In every phase, the GAM has always been able to disperse and hide in 
the jungle and mountainous areas and then reorganize into a better structure.  After East 
Timor independence, the GAM has inherited moral strength realizing that the TNI was 
“defeated”, as they had to withdraw from East Timor and many of the TNI and police 
members have been facing human rights tribunal court.  The GAM also calculated that 
the central government has been suffering economically due to the 1998 economic crisis 
and the legacy of a huge amount of debt inherited from the previous government.  The 
GAM had also received greater support from the population.  Moreover, they felt that the 
Indonesian TNI and police was morally worse as some of them were undisciplined and  
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even the GAM could purchase weapons from some of them.  The GAM leadership was 
very confident by saying that they had fought for 27 years, so why should they give up at 
this time? 
On the other hand, the results from the TNI’s last operation were tremendous.  
They succeeded in reoccupying hundreds of villages that were previously controlled by 
the GAM.  Many GAM members were shot, captured, or surrendered as were their 
supporters and sympathizers.  The TNI has been able to perform better by punishing 
some of its soldiers who violated the law during the operation.  The central government 
was trying to demonstrate that they have not yet been economically bankrupt by 
purchasing some military aircraft from Russia.  Above all, Indonesian politicians and the 
majority of the population have the same and strong commitment about the unity of 
Indonesia and not allowing Aceh to secede.   
Overall, both sides have their weaknesses albeit they have claims to success.  For 
a long time in the future, however, I believe that neither side has a chance of winning the 
war.  The GAM has not received any support from the international community.200  
Domestic support also has been decreasing after some of the captured or surrendered 
GAM members stated that the GAM also violated human rights.  Their propaganda of 
future wealth similar to Brunai was proven false.  On the other hand, the capability of the 
TNI to maintain their performance for a long time is in doubt.  The financial cost of war 
and the budget needed for reconstruction will cause problems for the government.  Over 
time, low salaries and unfinished conflict will easily lead to troop misconduct.  After 
almost five months of military operations, no high ranking officer of the GAM has been 
captured. 
Therefore, both sides will experience hardship in continuing the conflict.  
However, the GAM has a greater advantage as they do not need to conquer the military to 
win the war.  All they need is to just keep on existing and wait until the military and 
government ease or collapse. 
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B. RECONCILIATION 
The government and military should realize that they have no chance of winning 
the war by merely pursuing military options.  By understanding this reality, then they 
need to seek other options in addressing the conflict.  In the first place, I propose 
reconciliation with the GAM.  Reconciliation is a long-term process and requires strong 
will as well as the sincerity and desire to sacrifice personal or group interests.  It took 
years in South Africa and required five years to calm down the first rebellion in Aceh.  
The last negotiations between the GAM and the government failed because the 
government asked the GAM to lay down its weapons and surrender.  This was totally 
rejected by the GAM and they insisted on continuing to fight.  In fact, reconciliation 
between the government and the GAM is unlikely to happen as long as the GAM insists 
on its demand to secede and be independent.  Although both sides seemed to have a 
contradictory demand, I assume that the ultimate goal is the same.  I believe that both 
sides want to bring peace and welfare to Aceh.  The Indonesian government states that 
goal in its Constitution of 1945, and although there have been many deviations and 
weaknesses in the implementation, at least there has been a transition to progress.  
Examples are the decentralization and autonomy given to some provinces, and 
specifically the syariah law in Aceh amid several discrepancies in the implementation.  
The military has also been trying to improve their conduct, although this has not been 
completely perfect.   
The failed negotiations might be caused by not enough incentives for the GAM to 
surrender.  The government only asked them to lay down their weapons and accept 
autonomy, and the GAM saw no benefit for themselves.  I propose an end to the conflict 
by offering incentives to the GAM, both to the leadership in exile and to the GAM 
members in the field.   
Two absolute prerequisites for this policy are first, an irrevocable commitment 
from the government, in this case for the President to end the hostilities with Hasan Tiro 
as the top leader of the GAM, and second, the government should initiate several steps to 
begin building trust.   
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1. End the Leadership Hostilities 
Not many leaders were able to pursue this attitude.  In 1997, President Sadat of 
Egypt took a dramatic step when he decided to go to Jerusalem and speak to the Knesset 
of the Egyptian terms for peace.  President Sadat had learned that his long hostilities with 
Israel would not give Egypt a victory.  Therefore, he adopted a strategy to end hostilities 
with Israel by changing the enemy images of the Israelis.201  Recognizing that black 
resistance to the white power monopoly would only increase, President de Klerk of South 
Africa, despite his conservative reputation, began the process of ending apartheid in 
1990.202  His successor, President Nelson Mandela, established a Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission that grants amnesty to those who confess their roles in full 
during the apartheid era.203  Both F. W. de Klerk and Nelson Mandela were awarded the 
Nobel Peace Prize in 1993.   
To begin to settle the first rebellion, the military commander in Aceh took steps to 
establish personal contacts with the rebel leaders at the end of December 1956, although 
this was also part of his personal strategy within the internal political and military 
struggle.  In February 1957, he publicly announced his formula settlement called the 
Wise and Principal Policy, in which he “wisely” offered the rebels an opportunity to 
“return to the fold of the motherland”, while reserving for the government the “principle” 
to use force if necessary.204   
The will and wisdom of the Indonesian leadership to end hostilities, as the 
Egyptian and South African leaderships had done, are needed to change the image of all 
Acehnese as well as the GAM leadership toward the central government from the 
colonial era to nation-brotherhood.  The proposal basically offers the GAM leadership 
amnesty and restores their citizenship.  Restoring their citizenship means returning their 
political rights as well as their duty to uphold Indonesian law.  The government should 
                                                 
201 Janice Gross Stein: Image, Identity, and the Resolution of Violent Conflict, in Chester A. Crocker, Fen Osler 
Hampson, and Pamela Aal (eds), Turbulence Peace, United States Institute of Peace, 2001, p. 201. 
202 Encyclopedia.com, de Klerk, F. W., Available at [http://www.encyclopedia.com/html/d1/deK1lerk.asp], 
Accessed November 2003. 
203 South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission, Available at [http://www.facts.com/icof/south.htm], 
Accessed November 2003. 
204 Nazaruddin Sjamsuddin, The Republican Revolt, p. 260. 
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establish a direct dialogue with Hasan Tiro and offer him an opportunity to return and 
live in his homeland, and if possible, to cooperate with Aceh’s development.  A group of 
Acehnese ulama and scholars may be chosen to represent the Acehnese society to 
convince Hasan Tiro to accept this offer.  Some points that can be used as convincing 
factors are the reality that the GAM has only half a chance in winning the war because of 
their lack of international support, the Acehnese have been suffering for so long, and the 
government, to some extent, has fulfilled the Acehnese demand for autonomy and 
syariah law.  This decision, however, does not need to ease the military and police 
operations in the field, which is required to return security and law and order to Aceh.  
The GAM leadership is expected to reject the proposal, but the offering should be 
consistent.  This policy will demonstrate to the international community that the 
government always welcomes dialogue and peaceful opportunities, without giving up the 
state’s duty to security.  
2. Building Trust 
Granting amnesty or a reduced sentenced to the ex-GAM members is a good step 
towards building trust.  This will create an image that putting people on trial and 
punishing rebellion and their supporters is the government’s responsibility that must be 
upheld.  In the field, any GAM that has been captured and then sentenced should be given 
amnesty later, while GAM who surrender must be given amnesty instantly.  The 
consequences of this amnesty is giving the same chance to Indonesian troops or police 
members who committed human rights violations in the past as long as they confess their 
past abusive action and apologize individually to their victims.  In addition, the state 
should be responsible for supporting the victims until they can sustain life on their own.  
Another incentive that can be pursued is buying any weapons given by GAM members.  
Consequently, the military and police must apply the maximum penalty toward its 
members who sell or give weapons to the GAM.  Absorbing ex-GAM members into the 
TNI or police members can be taken into consideration as well but with some 
requirements.   
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Since the operation began, many ex-GAM members have been trained to achieve 
enough skills to start a normal life in civilian society205 and any GAM middle leadership 
who surrendered was not considered enemies by the government, but common 
citizens.206  These policies as well as how the government treated them after they 
surrendered should be consistently announced and disseminated through leaflets and any 
means possible so as to reach GAM members still living in the jungle. 
Although this policy is very difficult, I am sure that this is the only way to end 
conflict in Aceh.  Twenty seven years of conflict in Aceh have proven that both sides 
have been reaping nothing except hatred, grievances, hundreds of thousands of victims, 
and a society in ruins.  The process may take a long time, but this policy must be initiated 
immediately to start building trust between two sides.   
C. SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC REHABILITATION 
Often accompanying the establishment of security, social and economic 
rehabilitation well-being entails protecting the population from starvation, disease, and 
the elements.  The first step addresses fundamental needs for the affected population by 
providing emergency relief, and as the situation stabilizes, attention shifts from 
humanitarian relief to long-term social and economic development.207  By design, the 
Integrated Operation should provide humanitarian aid to the war-torn Acehnese.  Even 
before the military operation started, there were 6,000 refugees in Bireuen and just a 
week after the commencement of the operation, the number of refugees had doubled.  
Some of these people instantly left their homes as they were afraid of the impact of armed 
conflict between the GAM and the military.  Some were asked to move to refugee camps 
by authorities to prevent civilian casualties and as part of the anti-insurgency tactic to 
separate ordinary people from the rebels.  The GAM possibly forced some others to flee 
as part of their tactics I mentioned in previous chapters.  These internally displaced 
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persons (IDPs) have to face many classic refugee problems.  Half of the 2,414 IDPs who 
live in Reuleut Timur were reported to be suffering from scabies, acute respiratory 
infections, diarrhea, and five of them were sent to the hospital and died later.208  
Thousands of canned foods for refugees in Blang Pidie had expired209 and twelve 
refugees in South Aceh died from health problems.210  From the last report, at least 
10,425 IDPs still lived in refugee camps located in eight regions.211  It has not yet been 
clearly stated when these IDPs could return home since it depends on the security 
situation in their neighborhoods.  The government has to support their needs as long as 
the stay in the IDP camps and this requires a huge amount of money.   
Besides humanitarian problems, other challenges for the government are poverty 
and unemployment.  The Governor of NAD Province stated that 40% or 1.6 million of 
the NAD population live in poverty and the number of unemployed is approximately 
176,000 or 8% of the 2.2 million work force.212  Poverty and unemployment in Aceh 
caused by the economic crisis was quite high before and the latest operation significantly 
worsened the condition.  In the years 2000, 2001, and 2002, the poverty numbers in Aceh 
were 1,101,368 (26.50%), 1,223,704 (30.43%), and 1,409,828 (33.84%) respectively.213  
Although security might be the primary reason, the decline of the social condition 
indicates that the government development program could not confront the problems that 
arose.  Most of the provincial government development program does not address the 
poor people, does not have a tangible outcome, and lacks accountability.   
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Beginning this year, the provincial government stated that the development 
program under the name Gema Assalam will be observed by NGOs and the budget will 
be channeled directly to the community (kemukiman).  The allocation of 16-targeted 
kemukiman will vary between 500m to 1b rupiahs and the fund will be available as soon 
as the provincial government receives a proposal from each kemukiman.214  It does not 
state, however, which NGO will observe the project and where it is possible to access the 
accountability of the report.  The provincial government’s willingness to be transparent is 
being questioned since there were 392 unresolved corruption cases in FY 2002.215 
In the beginning of the Integrated Operation, the provincial government 
questioned the budget allocated by the central government for the humanitarian program, 
which only provided 500 billion rupiah.  The provincial government stated that the 
budget was extremely insufficient in restoring normal civilian life in Aceh even after the 
provincial annual budget of 6 trillion rupiah was added.216  In comparison, at the donor 
countries meeting in Bali on 21-23 January 2003, the CGI proposed 31 trillion rupiah for 
Aceh’s reconstruction.217  The provincial government also articulated its lack of funds to 
rebuild hundreds of burned schools.218   
With problems of corruption and a lack of accountability as well as a shortage of 
funds, the central and provincial government must radically change their policies to be 
successful in reconstructing Aceh.  One possible option is to implement a model of 
community-based development with some assumptions and some principles.  The first 
assumption is security and the second assumption is the limits placed on the military and 
government.  Development can only be done if security is assured.  The military authority 
divides the security level of a region into black, grey, and white areas representing the 
level of security.  Therefore, development should be started at the white region, which 
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represents the least threat.  As mentioned later, the provincial government faces an 
enormous job that needs extra effort to persevere while the military is very busy handling 
the security aspect.  Therefore, leaving some part of their duties to the neighborhood 
probably will ease their job loads.   
Meanwhile, the first principle is including Acehnese society in the development 
process based on a belief that the Acehnese have the right to be involved in decisions that 
affect their lives.  Using existing societal and cultural factors, this principle will ensure 
that the development goals correspond to the needs of the community.   
The second principle is utilizing and seeking every available fund wherever it 
comes from, either from individuals, the private sector, aid agencies as well as an 
allocated budget from the government.  I believe that Islamic organizations can be 
convinced to provide funds for community development in Aceh as it is the largest 
Moslem province in Indonesia.  Two possible organizations are Nahdlatul Ulama and 
Muhammadiyah, the first and second largest Moslem organizations with more than 60 
and 30 million members respectively.  While the community benefits from development 
programs, both organizations may be interested in enlarging their influence as the basis of 
their political parties.  Another option is Republika, an Islamic newspaper, which has a 
poverty relief program called Dompet Dhuafa, which raises funds from individual donors 
and which are then granted or soft-loaned to the targeted poor community.  Examples of 
the private sector that is possibly willing to participate are the Media Indonesia and 
Metro TV companies, which are owned by an Acehnese named Surya Palloh.  He may be 
interested in taking part not only because Aceh is his home province, but also to raise his 
popularity as a presidential candidate from the Golkar party in the 2004 elections.  The 
enthusiasm to donate could be seen on one occasion in Jakarta during a fundraiser for 
Aceh when an individual instantly donated 3 billion rupiah.219  The third principle is 
using a bottom up approach, in which development will be based on the consensus of the 
neighborhood and enhanced by broader participation.  In this case, the government role is 
providing or finding a technical assistant needed to support the program.  If the 
government follows this principle, the past mistakes, where the indigenous population 
                                                 
219 Serambi Indonesia On-Line, September 17, 2003, “Manusia tanpa nama sumbang Aceh Rp.3M,” Available at 
[http://www.indomedia.com/serambi/2003/09/170903h3.htm], Accessed September 2003.  
69 
had to migrate because of industrial development, will be prevented.  In addition, the 
government can also provide a wider network for marketing the products.  The fourth 
principle is starting the development at the village level as the very bottom of the society.  
Working in a smaller scale environment would reduce the risk of failure, since only a 
small amount of funds is needed.  It is easier to protect the project from a security 
standpoint, and hopefully it will bring more tangible results in a shorter period of time.  
An excellent example of these four principles was carried out in the Menggamat sub-
district of South Aceh.  Sponsored by the World Wildlife Fund Leuser Project (WWF-
LP), the Menggamat community, including village and religious leaders, formed a 
community conservation forest (CCF) to prevent uncontrolled or illegal logging in their 
area.  Under WWF-LP facilitation and assistance, the CCF succeeded not only in 
changing their habits and involvement in illicit logging, but it also stopped the vicious 
circle of illegal logging business networks and prevented further uncontrolled logging.  
Under technical assistance and environment knowledge given by WWF-LP, the villagers 
acknowledged and understood that by maintaining their forest and utilizing forest 
resources in a more manageable manner, they have a better future.  They are still able to 
acquire sufficient incomes while preserving the forest that will give them an everlasting 
economical source.220 
The last principle is accountability, which will assure that the allocated budget is 
well planned and properly managed.  An accountability report should be published and 
open to the public using available media coverage.   
D. GOVERNANCE AND PARTICIPATION 
In general, Aceh faces many of the same characteristics and challenges of 
regional government and development evident across Indonesia after decentralization.  
Responsibilities over resources and the delivery of services increased significantly for 
provincial and local governments.221  Moreover, the Aceh provincial government has to 
cope with humanitarian issues, economic problems, infrastructure reconstruction, the 
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implementation of autonomy and the syariah law.  On the other hand, people expected 
their government to address all the responsibilities and problems quickly.  Therefore, the 
duties of the provincial government are great and may be so great that it could really be 
beyond its capability.  To cope with these enormous duties, the provincial government 
must be willing to seek cooperation with other societies.  The Regional Emergency 
Military authority should encourage the provincial government to obtain more 
participation from society.  On the decision making level, there are plenty of international 
organizations, NGOs, and Acehnese as well as national scholars or universities who work 
and do research on Aceh.  On the field level, place an advisor in the community-based 
development project to provide a broader view of the economic prospects.  Presidential 
Decree No. 43 of 2003 does not completely halt the involvement of international 
organizations or NGOs.  The provincial government as well as the military need to build 
trust with international organizations and NGO, which is not such an easy task as it 
seems.  In his statement, the Regional Military Commander said that he sees the National 
Commission for Human Rights as a “threat”.  He sees it as a possibility that the military 
members who are treated like heroes today could be brought in front of a humanitarian 
court at some future date by the Commission.222  The international organizations do not 
want to deliver aid through government channels as they are afraid the funds could be 
diverted elsewhere.  The differences among the stakeholders should be discussed to find a 
compromise in pursuing the greater goal of Aceh’s sustainable peace, and certainly for 
the military and the government, the future of Indonesia’s unity.  Establishing a joint 
team that will investigate any single complaint or report about violations of the law or 
human rights can bridge differences between the military and human rights organizations.  
International donors can negotiate with the government, for instance, by delivering aid in 
the form of goods, not money.  They can also propose an individual contractor that they 
trusted to implement the rehabilitation project.  The very basic viewpoint, and possibly 
the most difficult for human rights organizations, is that they have to recognize 
Indonesian authority in Aceh.  In this case, the government may cooperate with 
organizations that accept this viewpoint and not cooperate with those who oppose this 
viewpoint until they can overcome their resistance. 
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Besides democratic values, people in a province such as Aceh with a Moslem 
majority, are dreaming of a leader able to implement Islamic teachings under Prophet 
Muhammad’s exemplar and his close companions.  The leadership in Aceh should 
remember the first statement of Abu Bakar after he was elected as the First Caliph:   
I have been given authority over you but I am not the best of you.  If I do 
well, help me, and if I do ill, then put me right.  Truth consists in loyalty 
and falsehood in treachery.  The weak among you shall be strong in my 
eyes until I secure his right if God will; and the strong among you shall be 
weak in my eyes until I wrest the right from him…. Obey me as long as I 
obey God and His apostle, and if I disobey them you owe me no 
obedience.223   
Thus, the leadership must have a critique-sensitive attitude and pay attention to 
whatever people say about their services and performance.  Many verses in the Qur’an 
state that people must take care of orphans and the poor, and the National Constitution of 
1945 also states that the government is responsible for the poor and the neglected people.  
The leadership in Aceh should uphold this principle since 40% of the Acehnese are 
categorized as poor and thousands are victims of previous and recent conflicts.  
Therefore, if the leadership in Aceh is able to care for ordinary Acehnese, I believe a 
sustainable peace will be easier and quicker to be achieved.  
E. CONCLUSION 
Previous policies had failed to end the protracted conflict in Aceh and I believe 
that they would not prevail in the future either.  The government should continuously 
enhance the Integrated Operation launched in May 19, 2003 for better performance as 
well as seeking other options to resolve the conflict.  The most desirable is reconciliation 
between the leadership and offering incentives for the GAM in the field to create a peace 
settlement.  At the same time, the government and military must collaborate with other 
parts of society as well as negotiate with any aid organizations to work together because 
it is just not possible to do this alone.  Community-based development is the most 
suitable for social and economic rehabilitation as it will engender broader participation 
and promote good and transparent governance.   
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VI. CONCLUSION 
Indonesia’s future is highly uncertain.  Besides armed separatism in its most 
western and eastern territories, the sitting government is facing so many problems, 
beginning with poverty, unemployment, a huge debt, ethnic clashes, corruption, 
deforestation, resources smuggling, illegal fishing, and the newest challenge of terrorism.  
One possible scenario for Indonesia’s future is disintegration.  Although there is an 
argument that the separation of Aceh and Irian Jaya would not lead to the domino effect 
of disintegrating the entire Indonesian territory, most Indonesians have a different 
perception.  For them, disintegration actually started with the independence of East 
Timor.  The parliament rejected President Habibie’s accountability report after East 
Timor achieved independence for this reason and the parliament also agreed to launch a 
military operation in Aceh.  Nevertheless, the government as well as the military must 
learn from past lessons on how to deal with the conflict in Aceh. 
A. SUMMARY 
The hardened resolve of the Acehnese struggle during the colonial period was 
motivated by their pre-colonial history of a glorious kingdom and having self-
determination.  The same reason motivated their demand for autonomy after Indonesian 
independence and caused the first rebellion in Aceh that lasted for almost nine years.  The 
central government quelled the first rebellion by restoring autonomy to Aceh supported 
and enforced by a “wise and principle” policy of Aceh’s regional military commander.  
The first rebellion was clearly driven by the Acehnese feeling of disappointment with the 
central government’s policy.  In the 1970s, the central government exploited natural 
resources and built a multi-billion dollar industrial complex in Aceh.  The central 
government receives a large amount of revenue from Aceh.  However, rapid development 
has created resentment as many of the indigenous population had to migrate from their 
own land.  Later on, the development had a negative impact due to environment pollution 
and unfair employment.  Hasan Tiro claiming that he is a legal heir to the Acehnese 
kingdom and a supporter of the first rebellion, unilaterally declared Acehnese 
independence in 1976 and initiated the first GAM rebellion.  The first GAM marked a 
protracted conflict in Aceh for the next 27 years.  For more than two decades, the GAM 
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leadership had always been able to modify their strategy and improve their struggle.  
Beginning with a relatively small armed forces and some support from the local 
population, eventually the GAM III enjoyed more backing.  The GAM’s fundamental 
strategy is to exploit the weaknesses of the Indonesian government and military.  The 
GAM leadership uses the poor governance of the central and provincial administration 
along with its incapability and the lack of discipline of its soldiers and police, as an 
effective means to fan the resentment of their local and foreign followers and supporters.  
This feeling of harboring grievances within the GAM leadership has easily trickled down 
to their core soldiers to sustain their struggle and spirit because of the shortcomings of 
their opponents.  On the other hand, the government and military had never learned from 
their flawed past.  Their strategies have never changed from a mainly military operation.  
The Indonesian economic crisis at the end of the 1990s and East Timor’s independence 
exacerbated the weaknesses of the central government and military, and once again, 
strengthened the GAM struggle.   
Indonesia has entered a transitional phase from authoritarian regime to a more 
democratic government and this transition also affected the government’s policy in Aceh.  
Peace talks had been initiated though all failed.  Another approach, such as economic 
development, was also introduced.  As the GAM’s struggle began to escalate more, 
another security approach was then unavoidable.  The foundation of operations in the 
economic and governance sectors requires the restoration of a secure environment and 
law and order.  The latest integration was designed to achieve such a goal.  However, the 
last efforts were hampered by a lack of military capabilities as well as the incapacitation 
of the government, both economically and politically.  Economically, Indonesia has not 
been able to lessen the impact of the past economic crisis.  Politically, the desire to fix the 
government’s internal weaknesses has not been very strong, for instance, in fighting 
corruption.  Therefore, although there has been some improvement in government and 
military policy, unless there is a significant change for the better in the government’s 







With the latest development of the GAM and the failure of past negotiations, a 
military option as part of an integrated operation was necessary as a paramount 
prerequisite for further rehabilitation and reconstruction.  However, since the conflict in 
Aceh was driven more by hatred, these options will not be sufficient to restore a 
sustainable peace in Aceh as it is unable to change the image of the central government 
and rectify the grievances.   
First of all, the government and military must be able to alleviate their own 
weaknesses by creating a better management strategy for good governance and 
establishing more professional police and soldiers.  The military has made some 
improvements in this direction.  Soldiers and police have received training in human 
rights, and those who violate these rights have been tried and punished.  However, many 
complaints from human rights organizations has been logged that were also quoted by 
foreign journalists.  I recommend using these complaints as inputs to investigate and 
clarify the facts in the field and choose any independent organization with which to work.  
If the military does not want to cooperate with any organization, at least correct it 
internally to improve professionalism and maintain discipline among the soldiers.  This is 
part of winning the war, and is necessary to avoid a careless and unaware attitude.  Some 
troops and police have also been given a strong warning about not extorting civilians or 
committing other illegal economic activities.  As Minister Kwik Kian Gie proposed, one 
solution is to improve the structure of the soldiers’ wage system that is beyond the reach 
of the military authorities.  The military may improve a soldier’s welfare by allocating 
more money from the budget to support the soldiers and their families posted on the 
frontlines, such as in Aceh.  This can be done by reducing non-combat activities or by 
temporarily deactivating non-crucial forces based on comprehensive and reliable 
evaluated strategies and tactics for the short and long term. 
Improvements have also been made in governance by investigating and 
prosecuting civil servants who misused the development or humanitarian aid budget.  As 
the highest authority in the emergency military region, the Aceh regional military 
commander must direct the provincial civilian government accountability policies, 
especially in budget and development, so as to avoid the ineffective use of limited 
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finances and build credibility.  It is necessary to establish a development program based 
on the principles of including the Acehnese in the decision making process, the bottom 
up approach, seeking any available financial sources, and requiring a more tangible 
outcome in the short term as well as accountability. 
Training of ex-GAM members in various skills in preparation for  returning them 
to civilian society should be coordinated as part of the entire development program of 
unemployment and economic empowerment. 
Better policies in military performance, governance, and economic development 
are proposed to raise the credibility of the government and military, and furthermore, to 
win the hearts and minds of the Acehnese.  Even these steps do not seem sufficient to 
attract the leadership and the main core of the GAM armed forces.  I suggest 
reconciliation with more incentives to establish a sustainable peace between the 
government and military on the one hand, and the GAM leadership and its field soldiers 
on the other.  A reconciliation program must be initiated with an irrevocable commitment 
by the president to end the hostilities with the GAM leader Hasan Tiro.  The subsequent 
steps are to grant amnesty and restore the citizenship for the GAM leadership in exile, 
direct amnesty for GAMs who surrender, material incentives for returning weapons, and 
reduced sentences for punished GAM members.  The government may start to implement 
these policies by releasing the ex-GAM negotiators from the last peace talks.  For 
whatever reason, capturing the negotiators sent a very strong image of colonialism since 
the Dutch had practiced similar tactics during the colonial era.   
Policies of reconciliation, economic development, good governance, and more 
professional soldiers and police does not mean the end of military operations.  Military 
operations are always needed whenever the threat exists.  If the GAM activities seem to 
have decreased recently, it is just part of their strategies and tactics.  I suggest that the 
government as well as the military avoid arrogance and an over-confident attitude as it 
will only create unawareness.  The statement of the Governor of Aceh224 that it is 
impossible for Aceh to secede from the Republic of Indonesia reminds me of the same 
statement made by Lieutenant General Benny Moerdani, an Indonesian Armed Forces 
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Commander at that time, that there is no independence for East Timor.  In fact, East 
Timor is an independent country now, while in Aceh, the government and military have 
not been able to solve the conflict in Aceh, either militarily or politically.  Aceh and the 
Acehnese need more tangible outcomes instead of rhetoric. 
Therefore, understanding the nature of the GAM’s struggle leads the government 
and military to basically fight against themselves for not doing the wrong thing while 
protecting civilians rather than threatening them.  If the government and military do not 
change their strategy and behavior, they cannot implement a proper strategy to win the 
war.  Whenever the military cannot win the war, even though they do not lose either, the 
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